Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Linville, Jr. was charged with leading a wave of burglaries throughout Thurston County, Washington. The State charged Linville with one count of "leading organized crime," in addition to 137 other offenses. Some of those 127 were listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4) as predicate offenses, which when combined, formed the requisite "pattern of criminal profiteering" on which "leading organized crime" was based. Some of the 127 were not listed in the statute as predicate crimes at all. The issue for the Washington Supreme Court's contemplation was whether the "joinder bar" rule of RCW 9A.80.085, permitted both predicate and nonpredicate crimes to be joined in a single "leading organized crime" information. Linville argued the State was barred from joining charges outside of the predicated offenses listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4). Linville also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not move to sever the unlisted offenses. The Supreme Court determined the Criminal Profiteering Act supported Linville's interpretation. However, the Court did not find Linville showed counsel was ineffective for choosing to defend against these crimes in one prosecution rather than several. The Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Linville" on Justia Law

After unsuccessfully representing himself at trial, Jerome Curry Jr. appealed his drug convictions to the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court's decision to allow Curry to represent himself. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should not have granted Curry's request to proceed pro se. The State appealed. Before the Washington Supreme Court could determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Curry's request for self-representation, it first had to determine whether Curry's request to represent himself was unequivocal. The Court held that it was, therefore reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding to the appellate court to resolve the remaining outstanding issues. View "Washington v. Curry" on Justia Law

Robert Tyler challenged his conviction for possessing a stolen vehicle. He contended the State was required to prove he engaged in all the actions that constitute "possession" of a stolen vehicle because these were listed in the to-convict jury instruction. Further arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove he "disposed of a stolen vehicle, Tyler contended his conviction had to be reversed and the case dismissed with prejudice. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Tyler's conviction, although on different grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeals, which viewed the jury instructions as setting alternative means of possessing stolen property, which became the “law of the case” under Washington v. Hickman, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). The appellate court held Hickman was abrogated by Musacchio v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 709 (2016). The Washington Supreme Court determined that was error in light of the Washington Court’s decision in Washington v. Johnson, 399 P.3d 507 (2017). In Johnson, the Washington Court confirmed Hickman remained good law. Because it was undisputed that the evidence established possession, the jury's verdict stood, and the Court affirmed Tyler's conviction. View "State v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2006, William Schorr pled guilty to first degree murder, first degree robbery, second degree arson, and first degree theft. Eleven years later, he filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) challenging the convictions of both first degree murder and first degree robbery on double jeopardy grounds. The Court of Appeals dismissed the PRP as untimely and treated the double jeopardy claim as waived. The Washington Supreme Court adhered to its decisions in prior cases holding that challenges to sentences that exceed the court's authority (like the double jeopardy challenge to the sentence in this case) cannot be waived. The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that double jeopardy claims were exempt from the one- year time bar on collateral challenges. Schorr's simultaneous convictions of first degree murder and first degree robbery did not violate double jeopardy clause protections: even though first degree felony murder predicated on first degree robbery would merge with the first degree robbery on which it is predicated, that was not the only means of first degree murder to which Schorr pleaded guilty. He also pleaded guilty to the alternative means of premeditated murder. “A first degree robbery conviction certainly does not merge with a first degree premeditated murder conviction.” The Supreme Court therefore dismissed Schorr’s personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Schorr" on Justia Law

At Gary Meredith's trial, the trial court mistakenly gave the State and defense counsel one less peremptory challenge than they were entitled to under CrR 6.4(e)(1) and CrR 6.5. Meredith claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the peremptory challenge violation on direct review. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed with Meredith, reversing his convictions and remanding for a new trial. However, under RAP 2.5(a), the appellate court could have refused to hear the claim of error because it was not objected to at trial and it is not a type of structural error that requires automatic reversal. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court held Meredith's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that claim of error. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Meredith" on Justia Law

Kevin Light-Roth was convicted of second degree murder in 2004, and the trial court sentenced him to 335 months' confinement. In an untimely personal restraint petition (PRP), Light-Roth argued Washington v. O'Dell, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), constituted a significant and material change in the law that applied retroactively to his sentence, excepting him from RCW 10.73.100’s time bar. The Court of Appeals granted Light-Roth's PRP and remanded for resentencing. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that O'Dell did not provide an exception to the time bar. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth" on Justia Law

This case concerns the admissibility of expert testimony about whether the subject individual suffers from a mental abnormality. In 2011, the State filed a petition to civilly commit 40-year-old Mark Black as an sexually violent predator (SVP) prior to his scheduled release from prison. In support of its petition, the State included the evaluation of Dr. Dale Arnold, who diagnosed Black with sexual sadism; paraphilia NOS, persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, nonexclusive; and personality disorder NOS with antisocial and narcissistic characteristics. Prior to trial. Black moved to exclude evidence of hebephilia and paraphilia NOS, persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, arguing that hebephilia is inadmissible pursuant to Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923). The trial court excluded the expert testimony regarding "hebephilia" on the basis that such a diagnosis was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The parties did not challenge that portion of the court's decision. However, Black argued the court committed reversible error by allowing expert testimony on a diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS), persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, non-exclusive." The Court of Appeals affirmed Black's civil commitment in an unpublished opinion. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on different grounds and held that the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it admitted expert testimony on paraphilia NOS, nor did it abuse its discretion when it allowed an expert to describe Black's specific paraphilic focus as "persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females." View "In re Det. of Black" on Justia Law

This case concerned the statutory interpretation of the portion of RCW 9.41.040 dealing with the requirements for restoration of firearm rights. In 1991, Edgar Dennis, III was convicted of second degree robbery, third degree assault and two counts of felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. In 1998, Dennis was convicted on third degree assault. The 1991 convictions disqualified him from possessing a firearm. After serving his sentence, he lived in the community for over fifteen years without a conviction. Then in 2014, he was convicted of misdemeanor first degree negligent driving. In 2016, Dennis petitioned for restoration of his firearm rights without disclosing the 2014 conviction. The State objected, informing the trial court of the 2014 conviction. The State argued the statutory requirement of a five-year conviction-free period had to immediately precede a petition for restoration. The superior court denied the petition. In moving for reconsideration, Dennis argued the trial court erred by not following the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute that any conviction-free five-year period satisfies the requirement. The Washington Supreme Court agreed that any five-year conviction-free period satisfied the requirement for eligibility to petition for restoration of firearm rights. View "Washington v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Washington State charged Christopher Blair with one count of theft of a motor vehicle, a Ford truck, that Blair purportedly stole in October 2011. Pursuant to that charge, he entered a drug court personal recovery program. Blair was terminated from the program in 2015. According to the record, Blair had five prior felony convictions in Washington, including second degree theft, second degree burglary, possession of a stolen vehicle, and two counts of theft of a motor vehicle at issue here. At sentencing, Blair argued for a "downward departure[from] the standard range" sought by the State and requested an exceptional sentence. Blair argued that although he had pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of a motor vehicle, both of those vehicles were snowmobiles, and therefore not "motor vehicles" as contemplated by RCW 9A.56.065. Blair asserted that his plea to the two counts were accordingly facially invalid. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Dennis should have alleged a constitutional defect of once of his prior convictions to challenge that conviction's validity for purposes of offender score calculation in an otherwise unrelated proceeding. The trial court declined to engage in statutory construction here and counted the two prior convictions at issue here for taking a motor vehicle. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, and the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Blair" on Justia Law

Matthew Schley was sentenced under the a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) after pleading guilty to first degree theft and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to 29.75 months of incarceration with chemical dependency treatment services, and 29.75 months of community custody that included a substance abuse treatment program. The DOSA statute provided that if a DOSA recipient fails to complete the treatment program or is administratively terminated from the program, the Department of Corrections shall revoke the DOSA. If revoked, the term of community custody is struck and the offender would serve the remainder of his or her sentence in prison. One week in, Schley received a fighting infraction, which set the stage for his DOSA revocation. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on what evidentiary standard due process requires when revoking that sentence. Schley filed a personal restraint petition alleging the DOSA revocation hearing violated his due process rights because the Department failed to prove the fighting infraction by the higher proof standard required at revocation hearings, preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Appeals granted relief, holding that a DOSA revocation indeed must be proved by a preponderance. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Schley" on Justia Law