Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brandon Cate was found guilty by jury of burglary, theft and malicious mischief. At sentencing, the State calculated Cate's offender score as 9+, the highest category, based on numerous alleged prior convictions. In proving the alleged prior convictions, the State failed to provide copies of the relevant judgment and sentence forms, relying instead on a prosecutor's summary of Cate's criminal history. Cate did not object, the 9+ score was thus used to calculate his present sentence. On appeal, Cate challenged the sentence as erroneous because the State failed to meet its burden of proving his criminal history at sentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed: relying on a portion of RCW 9.94A.530(2) risked shifting the burden to prove criminal history from the State to the defendant. Thus, the matter was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "Washington v. Cate" on Justia Law

Shelly Arndt was convicted by jury for first degree aggravated murder and first degree arson. She received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Arndt appealed, arguing her Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and her right to be free from double jeopardy were violated. After a careful review of the record, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the trial court's rulings limiting the testimony of Arndt's expert witness did not violate Arndt's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and were well within the court's discretion. Furthermore, the Court concluded Arndt's convictions for both first degree aggravated murder and first degree arson did not offend double jeopardy as the two crimes had separate purposes and effects, thus multiple punishments were allowed. View "Washington v. Arndt" on Justia Law

In late 2015, two men severely beat and killed 89-year-old Robert Hood. The two men, respondents Robert Pry and Robert Davis, forced their way into Hood's home, tied him up, and beat and robbed him. Pry and Davis contacted respondent Arnold Cruz for assistance. Cruz was not involved in the murder or robbery of Hood's home. Sometime later, Hood's caretaker visited Hood's home and, after noticing that. Hood was gone and someone had rifled through the house, alerted the police. Hood's body was eventually discovered stuffed in a blue plastic barrel. The police released Cruz's name to the press as a person of interest, and Cruz surrendered himself to law enforcement. At issue in this case was whether the information charging Cruz with rendering criminal assistance was constitutionally sufficient. Specifically, he contended the charging document had to include additional statutory elements from RCW 9A.76.050. The Washington Supreme Court held that because section .050 provided essential elements for rendering criminal assistance and Cruz's information lacked those elements, the information was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, dismissed the charge of rendering criminal assistance without prejudice, and remanded Cruz's case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Pry" on Justia Law

Broadly speaking, Seattle's First-In-Time ("FIT") rule requires Seattle landlords when seeking to fill vacant tenancies to provide notice of rental criteria, screen all completed applications in chronological order, and to offer the tenancy to the first qualified applicant (subject to certain exceptions). Plaintiffs were Seattle landlords who claimed the FIT rule facially violated their state constitutional rights. The trial court ruled the FIT rule was unconstitutional on its face because: (1) the rule facially effected a per se regulatory taking for private use; (2) the rule facially infringed on plaintiffs' substantive due process rights; and (3) the rule facially infringed plaintiffs' free speech rights. The Washington Supreme Court determined the FIT rule was constitutional, "[t]he FIT rule is unquestionably an experiment." The Court adopted the definition of regulatory takings set forth in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) for the purposes of Washington Constitution article I, section 16, and held plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing the FIT rule facially met this definition. The Court also clarified the rational basis review applied in substantive due process challenges to laws regulating the use of property, and held plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving the FIT rule failed rational basis review on its face. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that on its face, the FIT rule required only factual disclosures, and the City met its burden of showing the rule survived deferential scrutiny. View "Yim v. Seattle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bisir Muhammad was convicted by jury of first-degree felony murder and first degree rape. His victim, 69 years old at the time of her death; the jury found Muhammad knew or should have known his victim was particularly vulnerable. He received an exceptional sentence of two terms totaling 866 months to be served consecutively. The main issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying Muhammad's motion to suppress physical evidence collected from his vehicle after police located it via a warrantless cell phone "ping." Muhammad contended the location information provided by the cell phone ping was protected from warrantless searches under both the Washington and federal Constitutions. The majority of a divided Supreme Court agreed the ping was a search, permissible, and Muhammad's convictions for both felony murder predicated on rape and first degree rape violated double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals was affirmed in part, and reversed in part. By a vote of six to three, the Supreme Court agreed with ping was permissible. By a vote of five to four, the Court held felony murder and rape violated double jeopardy, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to dismiss the lesser-included offense. View "Washington v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

This case began with the theft of a backpack from a vehicle: the backpack contained cash and checks obtained for a school fundraiser. Several days after the vehicle prowl, defendant Jose Barboza-Cortes was video recorded at an ATM (automated teller machine) depositing four checks in his bank account, three of which had been in the stolen backpack. The fourth check listed "Dava Construction Company" in the top left comer. Police obtained a warrant to search defendant's residence for the backpack. During the search, police found methamphetamine in defendant's basement apartment and a shotgun under the mattress in the bedroom. There was no testimony that defendant owned the shotgun. A jury found defendant guilty of nine crimes, including second degree unlawful possession of a firearm and second degree identity theft. In this case the issue defendant’s appeal presented for the Washington Supreme Court was whether the second degree unlawful possession of a firearm statute, RCW 9.41.040(2)(a), and the second degree identity theft statute, RCW 9.35.020(1), were each alternative means statutes, and, if so, whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was required to give a unanimity instruction addressing the alternative means. The Supreme Court held that neither statute was an alternative means statute. Accordingly, the absence of a specific unanimity instruction regarding counts based on these statutes did not result in error. The Court of Appeals was reversed with respect to its holding that the second degree identity theft statute was an alternative means statute. View "Washington v. Barboza-Cortes" on Justia Law

Arthur West appealed a judgment finding the charges in his petition to recall Washington Governor Jay Inslee to be legally and factually insufficient to submit to voters. In his recall petition, West alleged the governor was absent from Washington too frequently and failed to properly notify the lieutenant governor of these absences, failed to declare homelessness a statewide emergency, and improperly campaigned for a ballot initiative. The trial court held that the charges were factually and legally insufficient. The Washington Supreme Court found that while West's petition may have stated reasons to disagree with Governor Inslee, but they were not proper reasons to support a recall. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court. View "In re Recall of Inslee" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Freedom Foundation sent Public Records Act (PRA) requests to several state agencies seeking disclosure of records for union-represented employees, including their full names, associated birth dates, and agency work email addresses. The agencies determined that all of the requested records were disclosable and, absent a court order, they intended to release the requested records. Several unions moved courts for preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent disclosure of the requested records. While a temporary injunction was granted as to most of the requested records, ultimately a permanent injunction was rejected. This case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review the issue of whether state employees had a protected privacy interest against disclosure of public records containing their birth dates associated with their names. The Supreme Court concluded the PRA did not exempt these records from disclosure, nor did the Washington Constitution, given that names and birth dates were widely available in the public domain. View "Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss" on Justia Law

Sergeant Paul Snyder stopped a jeep driven by defendant Joel Villela for speeding late one night in January 2018. The officer smelled alcohol on defendant's breath, and after defendant declined a roadside sobriety test, he was arrested on suspicion of driving while under the influence. The officer impounded the jeep under RCW 46.55.360. Pursuant to the statute, the officer did not consider whether there was a reasonable alternative to impounding the jeep, such as releasing it to one of defendant's two passengers. After the jeep was impounded, an inventory search was conducted whereby police found sandwich bags, digital scales, black cloth, pipes and cash, all of which were believed to have been associated with drug dealing. A search incident to arrest discovered cocaine on defendant himself; a possession with intent to deliver controlled substances charge was added to the DUI charge. Defendant moved to suppress fruits of the inventory search on grounds the search was not a lawful seizure under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. At issue before the Washington Supreme Court was whether RCW 46.55.360 was an unconstitutional expansion of what article I, section 7 allowed in only limited circumstances. To this, the Supreme Court agreed: "[o]ur constitution cannot be amended by statute, and while the legislature can give more protection to constitutional rights through legislation, it cannot use legislation to take that protection away." View "Washington v. Villela" on Justia Law

Matthew Schwartz pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. At sentencing, the State and Schwartz disputed whether two of Schwartz’s prior class C felony convictions should not have been included in his offender score under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (“SRA”). Specifically, the parties disagreed as to whether time spent n jail as a sanction for failing to pay legal financial obligations ordered on a felony conviction reset the five-year washout period under the Act. The Washington Supreme Court determined the Legislature did not intend that time spent in jail as a sanction for failing to pay legal financial obligations reset the five-year washout period. Accordingly, Schwartz’s 1997 and 2001 convictions washed out under the Act, and should not have been included in his offender score. View "Washington v. Schwartz" on Justia Law