Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved a challenge to former RCW 43.43.120(23)(a) (2001), which excluded certain overtime from the calculation of the monthly pension benefit granted under the Washington State Patrol Retirement System (WSPRS). Four Washington State troopers (Troopers) hired before the statute became effective claimed this exclusion of voluntary overtime from the calculation of their monthly pensions was an unconstitutional impairment of their contract with the State in violation of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution and article I, section 23 of the Washington State Constitution. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled: (1) the statute of limitations was three years and accrued at retirement; (2) there remained issues of material fact regarding whether the change was offset by comparable benefits; and (3) the change was reasonable and necessary to serve a legitimate public purpose. After review of that ruling, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on the statute of limitations and on comparable benefits. However, the Court vacated its legitimate public purpose ruling as premature given that the issue of comparable benefits remained for trial. The matter was remanded for additional proceedings. View "Hester v. Washington" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court violated petitioner Nicholas Conan Orn’s rights to confrontation and to present a complete defense when it barred him from cross-examining the State’s key witness to expose the witness’s bias. Orn was charged with attempted first-degree murder after he shot and wounded Thomas Seamans in Kent, Washington in 2016. At trial, Orn sought to cross-examine Seamans on the nature and extent of Seamans’s work as a confidential informant for the Kent Police Department (KPD). But the trial court limited Orn’s proposed line of cross-examination to a single, misleading question: “[I]sn’t it true that . . . you have actually worked with the Kent Police?” The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, and the Supreme Court granted review. The Supreme Court reiterated its holding in prior decisions that relevant bias evidence is admissible unless the State articulates a compelling interest for excluding it. Furthermore, the Court held that the single question the trial court allowed the defense to ask intros case "tended to obfuscate, rather than highlight, any potential bias. As a result, the trial court’s decision to exclude all other evidence related to that informant agreement violated constitutional protections and constituted an abuse of discretion." The Court found the State, however, carried its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that this constitutional error was harmless. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Washington v. Orn" on Justia Law

In King County, Washington, individuals subject to a warrantless arrest typically first appear before a district court judge to determine probable cause and set bail or release on personal recognizance (PR). The superior court obtains jurisdiction once an information is filed by the county prosecutor. Then without notice to the defendant, a superior court judge may make a dew decision to set bail or increase bail previously set by the district court. Petitioner Julian Pimentel asked the Washington Supreme Court to prohibit this practice by granting extraordinary relief by way of a writ of prohibition or mandamus against the King County Superior Court Judges (Judges) and the King County Prosecuting Attorney (Prosecutor). In the alternative, Pimentel sought a declaratory judgment. While the Supreme Court was sympathetic to Pimentel’s concerns, this original action for extraordinary writs was the wrong vehicle to provide the relief sought. Pimentel’s underlying criminal case, for which he was originally subject to a bail increase without prior notice, was dismissed over one year prior to the filing of this petition. Therefore, the Court dismissed the petition as moot and declined to reach the issue of whether a county prosecutor qualifies as a state officer for purposes of article IV, section 4 of the Washington constitution. Pimentel’s alternative request for declaratory relief was also dismissed for lack of original jurisdiction. View "Pimentel v. Judges of King Cty. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Petitioners Dwayne Bartholomew and Kurtis Monschke were each convicted of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole - a mandatory, nondiscretionary sentence under Washington’s aggravated murder statute. Bartholomew was 20 years old; Monschke was 19. Many years after their convictions, each filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) asking the Washington Supreme Court to consider whether article I, section 14 of the state constitution or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution permitted a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence for youthful defendants like themselves. "[W]hen it comes to mandatory LWOP sentences, [Miller v. United States, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)]'s constitutional guarantee of an individualized sentence - one that considers the mitigating qualities of youth - must apply to defendants at least as old as these defendants were at the time of their crimes." Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted both PRPs and ordered that Bartholomew and Monschke each receive a new sentencing hearing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke" on Justia Law

In this case, the superior court did not clearly state that it was “arresting or vacating” Respondent Anthony Waller’s judgment, or even granting his motion, in its first order on his CrR 7.8 motion. Instead, it skipped straight ahead to ordering a resentencing hearing. This case presented a question about the application of RAP 2.2(b)(3) in this unusual context: Does a series of superior court orders retaining jurisdiction of a CrR 7.8 motion, scheduling a resentencing hearing, ordering the prisoner transported for that resentencing hearing, and clarifying that the first order did indeed grant the CrR 7.8 motion, amount to granting the motion and “vacating” the old sentence within the meaning of RAP 2.2(b)(3)? The Washington Supreme Court held that it did, and reversed the Court of Appeals. "[W]hen a superior court receives a CrR 7.8 motion, it should follow the CrR 7.8(c) procedures. Pursuant to those procedures, the court should ordinarily hold a show cause hearing before granting relief." View "Washington v. Waller" on Justia Law

Washington’s strict liability drug possession statute, RCW 69.50.4013, made possession of a controlled substance a felony punishable by up to five years in prison, plus a hefty fine; leads to deprivation of numerous other rights and opportunities; and did this without proof that the defendant even knew they possessed the substance. In 2016, police executed a search warrant in Spokane, Washington, seeking evidence of stolen vehicles. They arrested three people on the property, including petitioner Shannon Blake. At the jail, a corrections officer discovered a small baggy containing methamphetamine in the coin pocket of Blake’s jeans. The State charged Blake with possession of a controlled substance. At a bench trial, Blake relied on the affirmative defense of "unwitting possession:" a friend bought the jeans secondhand and gave them to Blake two days before Blake's arrest; Blake never used methamphetamine and did not know drugs were in the pocket; and Blake's boyfriend testified Blake was not a drug user. The trial court found Blake possessed drugs without finding her possession was intentional or knowing. The court concluded Blake did not meet her burden proving her possession was unwitting. This case presented an issue of first impression for the Washington Supreme Court: whether the strict liability drug possession statute with these substantial penalties for such innocent, passive conduct exceeded the legislature’s police power. The Court concluded the answer was yes, this exceeded the State's police power. Blake's conviction was vacated. View "Washington v. Blake" on Justia Law

The Freedom Foundation was a nonprofit organization that describes itself as committed to “advanc[ing] individual liberty, free enterprise and limited, accountable government in the Evergreen State.” The Foundation brought citizen’s actions against Teamsters Local 117; Service Employees International Union Political Education and Action Fund (SEIU PEAF); and Governor Inslee, the Department of Social and Health Services, and Service Employees International Union 775 for various alleged violations of Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA). In consolidated appeals, the issue common to all was whether the Freedom Foundation satisfied the FCPA’s prerequisites before filing their citizen’s actions. In each case, the superior courts ruled the Foundation failed to meet a 10-day deadline required by the FCPA and, accordingly, entered judgment for respondents. After review, the Washington Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. With respect to the Foundation's suit against the Teamsters Local 117, the Supreme Court determined that though the superior court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings to the union, the court’s entry of judgment would have been proper as summary judgment, and was thus affirmed. This result precluded the Foundation’s other challenges to the superior court’s rulings, which were therefore not addressed. As to the union's cross-appeal of its counterclaim against the Foundation under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Foundation was not a state actor, was not wielding powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State, and therefore was not subject to suit under section 1983. View "Freedom Found. v. Teamsters Local 117" on Justia Law

This case involved a recall petition against Thurston County, Washington, Sheriff John Snaza. Petitioner Arthur West alleged Snaza committed a recallable offense because he stated in a press release that he would not enforce an order issued by the Washington State secretary of health intended to combat the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic. Snaza appealed the trial court’s conclusion that the recall charge was factually and legally sufficient. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Snaza had discretion and his exercise of discretion (stating he would not criminally enforce the order) was not manifestly unreasonable. Therefore, the recall charge was neither factually nor legally sufficient, and the trial court's decision was reversed. View "In Re Recall of Snaza" on Justia Law

In 1978, 17-year-old Carl Brooks pleaded guilty to eight counts of first degree robbery, first degree rape, first degree kidnapping, first degree assault, second degree murder, and first degree burglary, all while armed with a deadly weapon. Over the span of three days, Brooks carjacked, robbed, and raped a woman while her son was present; attempted to rob a couple where gunfire between Brooks and the male victim led to the shooting death of the victim’s wife; carjacked and robbed a third woman; and threatened a fourth woman in her home, demanded financial information, and assaulted her. Brooks had prior convictions in both juvenile and adult court. At the time, sentencing in Washington was “indeterminate:” trial courts sentenced offenders to the maximum amount of time that could be served. But the amount of time the offender would actually serve was largely controlled by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles (parole board) who would set the minimum term, taking into account recommendations by the trial court and prosecutor. The judge ordered five of the life sentences to run concurrently, and the remaining three to run consecutively, effectively sentencing Brooks to four consecutive “blocks” (or groupings) of life sentences. Both the prosecutor and the court recommended that the parole board give Brooks minimum terms of life. Departing from the recommendations slightly, the parole board set minimum terms of 20, 25, 25, and 20 years for the four blocks, for a minimum total of 90 years. Not long after Brooks was sentenced, the Washington legislature replaced the indeterminate sentencing system with a determinate system. For those sentenced under the former indeterminate sentencing system who were still incarcerated, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) (the successor to the parole board) was directed to “attempt to make [parole] decisions reasonably consistent” with the Sentencing Reform Act. While Brooks has been serving his time, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The Washington Supreme Court determined that by its plain language, RCW 9.94A.730 applies to Brooks’ sentence. The ISRB was ordered to provide Brooks with a hearing under RCW 9.94A.730 that presumed release. Accordingly, the Court granted the Personal Restraint Petitioned, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded to the ISRB for further proceedings. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks" on Justia Law

Long before his judgment and sentence was final, Vincent Fowler hired and paid an attorney, John Crowley, to prepare and file his personal restraint petition (PRP). But after repeatedly and falsely assuring his client he was working on the PRP, Crowley stopped responding to calls. As the one-year time bar approached and it became apparent Crowley had abandoned him, Fowler hired a new attorney. Fowler learned Crowley had resigned his law license rather than face professional discipline for failing to diligently represent other clients, among other things. Before the time bar passed, Fowler’s present counsel filed a “placeholder” PRP explaining he needed additional time to get Fowler’s legal file and investigate grounds for relief. After the time bar had passed, counsel filed a “supplemental” PRP arguing Fowler’s trial attorney was ineffective. The Court of Appeals dismissed the PRP as untimely. The Washington Supreme Court determined equitable tolling was warranted in this case. "The misconduct of Fowler’s attorney was egregious and Fowler exercised diligence." The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration on the merits. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Fowler" on Justia Law