Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In Washington State, most voters cast their votes by mail, and each voter must swear under oath that they are eligible to cast that ballot. Election workers must verify that the signature on the voter’s sworn ballot declaration matches the signature on file. If the signature cannot be verified, the ballot may be challenged, and if the voter does not cure their ballot in time, their vote will not be counted. The plaintiffs argue that this signature verification process results in some lawfully cast ballots not being counted, thus violating the due process, privileges and immunities, and freedom of elections clauses of the state constitution.The trial court denied all parties' summary judgment motions and adopted the Anderson-Burdick framework to determine the level of scrutiny for the case. The court concluded that additional factual development was required and reserved ruling on whether signature verification was severable from the rest of the statutory scheme. The defendants moved to certify the trial court’s order for immediate review, which the plaintiffs did not oppose. The court certified two questions for review: the appropriate standard of judicial review for the plaintiffs’ facial challenges and whether any party is entitled to summary judgment under that standard.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that signature verification, when coupled with the increasingly expansive cure system, does not facially violate the state constitution. The court held that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment, reversing in part, affirming in part, and remanding for entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court emphasized that the right to vote is fundamental and that the signature verification process, as part of a robust system of checks, provides both security and ease of voting. View "Vet Voice Foundation v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

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Mary Mercedes was accused of animal cruelty based on evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her property. Officers visited her property multiple times after receiving complaints about the condition of her animals. During these visits, Mercedes allowed the officers to view the animals, and based on their observations, a search warrant was later issued. The officers then seized the animals, and Mercedes was charged with two counts of animal cruelty.The trial court granted Mercedes's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the property visits, ruling that the officers' consent to enter was invalid without providing Ferrier warnings, which inform individuals of their right to refuse, limit, and revoke consent. The trial court dismissed the charges due to lack of probable cause. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Ferrier warnings were not required for the search of Mercedes's outdoor property and remanded the case to determine if her consent was voluntary.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Ferrier warnings are required only when officers seek to enter a person's home to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of a crime. Since the officers' visits to Mercedes's property were for investigative purposes and did not involve entering her home, Ferrier warnings were not necessary. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if Mercedes's consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. View "State v. Mercedes" on Justia Law

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Several members of the public requested records from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) regarding officers who attended the January 6, 2021, rally in Washington, DC. The officers involved filed a lawsuit to prevent the release of their identities, arguing that their identities should be exempt from disclosure based on statutory and constitutional privacy rights. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of their identities within those public records.The King County Superior Court denied the officers' motion for a preliminary injunction, determining that the officers failed to show that the information in the public records was likely exempt from disclosure. The court also denied the officers' motion to proceed under pseudonyms. The officers appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that the First Amendment prohibited the disclosure of the officers' identities. The Court of Appeals did not evaluate whether the disclosure would violate the officers' statutory right to privacy under the Public Records Act (PRA).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the officers did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits that their identities were exempt based on either a statutory or constitutional right to privacy. The court concluded that the officers did not have a privacy interest in their identities as public employees who attended a highly publicized event. The court also held that the officers did not show a need to litigate under pseudonyms. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "John Does v. Seattle Police Dep't" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Jack Potter, a man who lived in a 23-foot travel trailer hitched to his truck, which he parked on public lots and streets in the city of Lacey, Washington. In 2019, the city passed an ordinance barring people from parking such large vehicles and trailers on public lots and streets for more than four hours per day. The city then ordered Potter to move his trailer and truck off the city hall parking lot and off Lacey streets. Potter sued the city, claiming that its new ordinance violated his state constitutional “right to reside,” which he argued was inherent in the state constitutional right to intrastate travel.The case was initially filed in Thurston County Superior Court but was later moved to the federal district court for the Western District of Washington. The district court granted summary judgment to the city on nearly all of its claims, including Potter’s state right to intrastate travel claim. The court explained that the ordinance did not fundamentally impede the right to exist or reside in a given area. It was a parking ordinance applicable to all people in Lacey, and only by extension did it restrict the manner in which a person could live in Lacey. The right to travel did not include a right to live in a certain manner.The case was then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified questions of state law to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. The Supreme Court held that the RV parking ordinance did not violate Potter’s claimed Washington State constitutional right to intrastate travel. Potter had not established that his claimed right to reside was inherent in a Washington state constitutional right to intrastate travel or that it protected his preferred method of residing in Lacey: by siting his 23-foot trailer on a public street in violation of generally applicable parking ordinances. View "Potter v. City of Lacey" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the issue of whether a criminal defendant can be required to appear for nonjury proceedings from an "in-court holding cell" without an individualized inquiry justifying such a restraint. The defendant, Cassandra Luthi, was required to appear for a nonjury hearing from an in-court holding cell at the Cowlitz County Jail courtroom. Despite Luthi’s objections, the superior court did not conduct an individualized inquiry to determine whether such a restraint was justified, believing that it was unnecessary to do so.The superior court had required Luthi to appear from an in-court holding cell for her hearing, without conducting an individualized inquiry into whether this restraint was justified for security reasons. The State argued that the in-court holding cell did not implicate the due process right to appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles except in extraordinary circumstances, and that these due process protections did not apply to Luthi’s hearing because it was not a trial and there was no jury.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the in-court holding cell undermines the presumption of innocence, interferes with a defendant’s ability to communicate with counsel, and violates the dignity of the defendant and the judicial proceedings. Therefore, absent an individualized finding that such a restraint is necessary to protect essential state interests such as physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum, the routine use of this in-court holding cell violates federal and state constitutional due process protections against inherently prejudicial courtroom practices. The court reversed the superior court, granted Luthi’s requested relief, and remanded for a new hearing. View "State v. Luthi" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, several construction industry associations challenged a 2018 law (RCW 39.12.015(3)) that changed the method for determining prevailing wage rates on public works projects. Prior to the law, the State used wage and hour surveys to establish the prevailing wage rates. The 2018 law directed the State to adopt the wage rates established in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) for those trades and occupations that have CBAs.The plaintiffs argued that the new law violated a provision of the Washington Constitution (article II, section 37) because it conflicted with an older law (RCW 39.12.026(1)) that restricted the use of wage data collected by the State to the county in which the work was performed. The Court of Appeals agreed and declared the new law unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the older law's restriction on the use of wage data applied only to data collected through wage and hour surveys, not to wage rates adopted from CBAs. Therefore, the older law did not conflict with the new law, and the new law did not violate the state constitution. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Associated General Contractors Of Washington v. State" on Justia Law

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In "King County v. Michael J. Abernathy et al.", the Supreme Court of the State of Washington answered a question certified by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The case involved a dispute over the ownership of a 3.6 mile section of land along the shore of Lake Sammamish, known as the Corridor. In 1887, prior to Washington becoming a state, a railroad company was granted a "right-of-way" to build a railroad over the Corridor. Since then, the Corridor and surrounding shorelands have been used by various parties including individual property owners, the state, and the county. The certified question asked whether a right-of-way approved by the United States Department of the Interior under the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 is a conveyance "patented by the United States" under Article XVII, Section 2 of the Washington State Constitution. If the land was "patented" by the federal government, it would have been owned by the railroad and later King County. If the land was not patented, Washington would have owned it at the time of statehood and later conveyed it to private parties, and the shoreland would currently belong to the homeowners, the Abernathys. The Washington Supreme Court held that the right-of-way was an easement and did not constitute a land conveyance patented by the United States. Therefore, the land belonged to Washington at the time of statehood and is presently owned by the homeowners. View "King County v. Abernathy" on Justia Law

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In the State of Washington, a man named Mitchell Heng was charged with murder, arson, and robbery. He was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing without counsel, during which the judge set bail among other things. Heng argued that counsel should have been present at this hearing. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington agreed, noting that a person charged with a crime has a right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions and under court rules. However, the court found that Heng did not demonstrate that the hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution, and it believed that the absence of counsel did not contribute to the verdict. Consequently, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.The facts of the case reveal that Heng was implicated in a robbery at Sifton Market during which Amy Hooser was killed. Surveillance footage showed Heng at the scene with a blood-stained shirt and a lighter in his hands. He was charged the next day with first degree murder, first degree robbery, and first degree arson. Heng was held in jail for 31 months before his trial, during which time he made inconsistent statements during recorded phone calls about the events of the night of the crime. He was eventually convicted of first degree murder and first degree arson and was sentenced to 374 months in prison.Heng appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to counsel had been violated at a critical stage of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while Heng should have had counsel present at his preliminary hearing, this did not constitute a critical stage of the prosecution. The court also noted that in order for an error to be considered structural and thus necessitate automatic reversal, it must have substantively affected the outcome of the case. The court determined that Heng’s case was not demonstrably affected by his counsel’s absence. As such, the court applied constitutional harmless error analysis, which requires the court to reverse unless it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. The court concluded that the failure to have counsel present at Heng’s preliminary hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "State v. Heng" on Justia Law

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Michael Shawn Charlton was arrested and charged with third-degree child rape, third-degree child molestation, and indecent liberties. He appeared in preliminary hearings without counsel, which he argued on appeal was a denial of his constitutional right to counsel at critical stages of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while the absence of counsel was indeed a constitutional error, it did not constitute a critical stage of litigation requiring automatic reversal. The court reasoned that nothing in the record suggested that Charlton's rights were lost, defenses were waived, privileges were claimed or waived, or that the outcome of the case was otherwise substantially affected by the absence of counsel. Furthermore, the court concluded that any error in not having counsel present was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because there was no evidence to suggest that the lack of counsel affected the verdict in any way. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Charlton" on Justia Law

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In the case presented, plaintiff Bette Bennett alleged that she suffered a traumatic brain injury due to medical negligence by the defendant, the United States. However, the cause of her injury was not diagnosed until after the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under Washington law had expired, making it impossible for her to timely commence her lawsuit. The United States moved to dismiss her complaint as time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to decide whether the statute of repose violates certain provisions of the Washington Constitution. The court held that while the legislature has broad authority to set time limits for commencing an action, the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under RCW 4.16.350(3) violates the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that the statute implicates the fundamental right of state citizenship by limiting the pursuit of common law claims against certain defendants, but it does not satisfy the "reasonable ground" test under the state constitution. Therefore, the court concluded that the statute of repose is unconstitutional under independent state law. The court declined to reach the second certified question regarding whether the statute of repose unconstitutionally restricts a plaintiff's right to access the courts in violation of the Washington Constitution. View "Bennett v. United States" on Justia Law