Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Erika Rickman brought this suit against her former employer, Premera Blue Cross, for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Rickman alleged she was terminated in retaliation for raising concerns about potential violations of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and its Washington counterpart, the Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA). The trial court dismissed Rickman's suit on Premera's motion for summary judgment, concluding Rickman could not satisfy the jeopardy element of the tort because Premera's internal reporting system provided an adequate alternative means to promote the public policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court granted review of this case and two others in order to resolve confusion with respect to the jeopardy element of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Consistent with its decisions in the other two cases, the Court held that nothing in Premera' s internal reporting system, nor in HIPAA or UHCIA, precluded Rickman's claim of wrongful discharge. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals but remanded for that court to address Premera's alternate argument for upholding the trial court's order of dismissal. View "Rickman v. Premera Blue Cross" on Justia Law

Respondent Gregg Becker began working for Rockwood Clinic PS, an acquired subsidiary of Community Health Systems (CHS) 1 as its chief financial officer (CFO) in February 2011. As a publicly traded company, CJ-IS is required to file reports with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As Rockwood's CFO, Becker was required by state and federal law to ensure that Rockwood's reports did not mislead the public, which also required his personal verification that the reports did not contain any inaccurate material facts or material omissions. In October 2011, Becker submitted to CHS' financial department an "EBIDTA," calculation. Becker was not told that when CHS acquired Rockwood, it represented to creditors that the acquisition would incur a $4 million operating loss. To cover the discrepancy, CHS' financial supervisors allegedly directed Becker to correct his EBIDTA to reflect the targeted $4 million loss. CHS did not provide a basis for its low calculation. Becker refused, fearing that the projection would mislead creditors and investors in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The CEO made clear that Becker's refusal to do so put his position in jeopardy; Becker felt compelled to resign unless CHS responded to his concerns. CHS and Rockwood accepted Becker's resignation. CHS filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Becker's complaint for wrongful termination, contending that the jeopardy element of the tort had not been met because there were adequate alternative means to protect the public policy of honesty in corporate financial reporting. The Court of Appeals accepted review and determined that the jeopardy element had been satisfied because the alternative administrative enforcement mechanisms of SOX were inadequate and therefore did not foreclose common law tort remedies for employees. The Supreme Court's holding in "Rose v. Anderson Hay" instructed that alternative statutory remedies were to be analyzed for exclusivity, rather than adequacy. Under that formulation, neither SOX nor Dodd-Frank precluded Becker from recovery. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Community CHS' CR 12(b)(6) motion, and affirmed the Court of Appeals in upholding that decision upon certified interlocutory review. View "Becker v. Comm'y Health Sys., Inc.." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to the constitutionality of the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP statute). Anti-SLAPP statutes punish those who file lawsuits (labeled strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPPs) that abuse the judicial process in order to silence an individual's free expression or petitioning activity. Plaintiffs and supporting amici curiae contended the anti-SLAPP statute's burden of proof, stay of discovery, and statutory penalties are unconstitutional on several grounds. They contended some or all of these provisions violated the right of trial by jury under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution; the Washington separation of powers doctrine under "Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, PS"(216 P.3d 374 (2009)); the Washington right of access to courts under Putman; the petition clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the vagueness doctrine under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the anti-SLAPP statute violated the right of trial by jury, but did not resolve how these other constitutional limits may have applied to the anti-SLAPP statute's provisions: "The legislature may enact anti-SLAPP laws to prevent vexatious litigants from abusing the judicial process by filing frivolous lawsuits for improper purposes. But the constitutional conundrum that RCW 4.24.525 creates is that it seeks to protect one group of citizen's constitutional rights of expression and petition-by cutting off another group's constitutional rights of petition and jury trial. This the legislature cannot do." View "Davis v. Cox" on Justia Law

Scott Walter Maziar sustained injuries while on board a ferry operated by the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC). Maziar used the ferry to get to and from work. Since Maziar was injured at sea, he brought a general maritime negligence claim against the DOC. He initially requested a jury trial, but he moved to strike his demand because he thought that no jury trial right existed for general maritime negligence cases. The DOC objected, but the trial court agreed with Maziar, struck his jury request, and awarded him damages after a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on the jury trial issue but on different grounds, holding that although a jury trial right generally applied to general maritime negligence actions in state court. The State did not have a constitutional or statutory jury trial right in tort actions. The issue this case presented on appeal was whether the State had a jury trial right in tort actions. The Court held that it does: several statutes read together demonstrate that the legislature meant to treat the State as if it were a private party with regard to matters of civil procedure and confer on any party (including the State) the right to have a jury determine most matters of fact. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a jury trial. View "Maziar v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

This is a consolidated case of two medical malpractice suits. In each case, the trial judge gave the jury instruction on a physician's exercise of judgment, similar to 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil105.08 (6th ed. 2012) (WPI) was given. Both juries found in favor of the defendants and both plaintiffs appealed. After review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of the exercise of judgment jury instruction. Furthermore, the Court held that evidence of consciously ruling out other diagnoses is not required; a defendant need only produce sufficient evidence of use of clinical judgment in diagnosis or treatment to satisfy a trial judge that the instruction is appropriate. "We reaffirm that this instruction is supported in Washington law and has not been shown to be incorrect or harmful." View "Fergen v. Sestero" on Justia Law

Petitioners William Ralph and William Forth et al. (Forth) appealed the dismissal of their separate actions against the State of Washington Department of Natural Resources, Weyerhaeuser Company, and Green Diamond Resource Company (collectively DNR). They sought monetary damages for the flooding of real property located in Lewis County. At issue was the distinction between venue and jurisdiction, in the context of the applicable statutory authority that actions "for any injuries to real property" "shall be commenced" in the county in which the property is located, RCW 4.12.010(1). Case law from the 1940s and 1950s held that RCW 4.12.010 was jurisdictional, so that an improperly commenced action must be dismissed if filed in a superior court outside the local county. More recently, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted similar (but not identical) statutes to prescribe only venue in light of article IV, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution, which grants universal original subject matter jurisdiction to the superior courts. In dicta in "Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington," (268 P.3d 892 (2011)), the Court suggested that it might reconsider earlier precedent. By its opinion in this case, the Court reconsidered that earlier precedent, and held that RCW 4.12.010 related to venue, not jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's holding in this case and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ralph v. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

Donald Martin was killed by a machine at a paper plant. His widow Nina Martin tried to sue the company that installed the machine, but that company no longer existed. Martin had difficulty discerning which company was responsible for the installation company's liability because the merger and acquisition history of the installation company was complicated. Because of that complicated history, Martin sued the incorrect company and did not realize who the responsible party was until after the statute of limitations period expired. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether Martin met the requirements of the rule that allowed such plaintiffs to add the correct defendant after the statute of limitations period expired, and whether her inability to identify the correct defendant was due to inexcusable neglect. The Court held that it was not: the record did not show that the proper defendant's identity was easily ascertainable by Martin during the limitations period. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Martin v. Dematic" on Justia Law

In 2006, a handicap access ramp platform at a residential construction site in Spanaway collapsed when plaintiff Jesse Powers used it. Powers fell while working for Awning Solutions, a company hired by Premier Communities Inc. to install an awning on a modular building. Premier also contracted with Pacific Mobile Structures Inc. to supply the ramp that collapsed. Unknown to Powers, Awning Solutions, or Premier, Pacific had subcontracted with W.B. Mobile to install the ramp that collapsed. After falling, Powers attempted to find out who "put the ramp the together," including making inquiries to Awning Solutions, but Awning Solutions thought that Pacific installed the ramp. In 2009, Powers filed a personal injury suit against Premier, Pacific, and John Doe One and John Doe Two, identifying "John Doe One" as the "builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred." The statute of limitations for Powers' suit expired on June 2, 2009. Powers timely served Pacific on June 5, 2009, and Premier on June 12, 2009. Powers did not serve the John Does or W.B. Mobile at that time. Finally, over a year after filing his complaint, Powers obtained a discovery response from Pacific in October 2010 identifying W.B. Mobile as the installer of the ramp. Four months after Pacific's discovery response, in February 2011, Powers moved to amend his pleading to replace John Doe One with "W.B. Mobile." The trial court granted W.B. Mobile's motion to dismiss for failure to bring claims within the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Powers' serving Pacific and Premier within ninety days of filing his complaint tolled the statute of limitations on Powers' claim against W.B. Mobile, and remanded for a trial on the merits. Finding no error with the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Powers v. WB Mobile Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After Theresa Scanlan filed a personal injury action against Karlin Townsend, a process server delivered a copy of the summons and complaint to Townsend's father at his home. But Townsend did not live at her father's home. Townsend's father later handed the summons and complaint directly to Townsend within the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed for lack of service, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Finding no error with the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Scanlan v. Townsend" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether, under Evidence Rules (ER) 702 through 705, the trial court properly admitted expert biomechanical testimony in an automobile collision case. In August 2006, Dawn Matsunaga rear-ended the car that Cathy Johnson-Forbes was riding in. Johnston-Forbes claimed that she suffered injuries as a result of the collision and sued Matsunaga. Before trial, Matsunaga identified Dr. Allan Tencer as an expert who would be testifying as a biomechanical engineer. In a motion in limine, Johnston-Forbes moved to exclude Tencer's testimony, arguing that he was not qualified as an engineer, that his opinion lacked sufficient foundation, and that in viewing photographs he could not account for Johnston-Forbes's precise body position at the time of impact. The trial court limited Tencer's testimony but denied Johnston-Forbes's motion, and the jury returned a verdict for Matsunaga. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Johnston-Forbes v. Matsunaga" on Justia Law