Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This is a consolidated case of two medical malpractice suits. In each case, the trial judge gave the jury instruction on a physician's exercise of judgment, similar to 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil105.08 (6th ed. 2012) (WPI) was given. Both juries found in favor of the defendants and both plaintiffs appealed. After review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of the exercise of judgment jury instruction. Furthermore, the Court held that evidence of consciously ruling out other diagnoses is not required; a defendant need only produce sufficient evidence of use of clinical judgment in diagnosis or treatment to satisfy a trial judge that the instruction is appropriate. "We reaffirm that this instruction is supported in Washington law and has not been shown to be incorrect or harmful." View "Fergen v. Sestero" on Justia Law

Petitioners William Ralph and William Forth et al. (Forth) appealed the dismissal of their separate actions against the State of Washington Department of Natural Resources, Weyerhaeuser Company, and Green Diamond Resource Company (collectively DNR). They sought monetary damages for the flooding of real property located in Lewis County. At issue was the distinction between venue and jurisdiction, in the context of the applicable statutory authority that actions "for any injuries to real property" "shall be commenced" in the county in which the property is located, RCW 4.12.010(1). Case law from the 1940s and 1950s held that RCW 4.12.010 was jurisdictional, so that an improperly commenced action must be dismissed if filed in a superior court outside the local county. More recently, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted similar (but not identical) statutes to prescribe only venue in light of article IV, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution, which grants universal original subject matter jurisdiction to the superior courts. In dicta in "Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington," (268 P.3d 892 (2011)), the Court suggested that it might reconsider earlier precedent. By its opinion in this case, the Court reconsidered that earlier precedent, and held that RCW 4.12.010 related to venue, not jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's holding in this case and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ralph v. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

Donald Martin was killed by a machine at a paper plant. His widow Nina Martin tried to sue the company that installed the machine, but that company no longer existed. Martin had difficulty discerning which company was responsible for the installation company's liability because the merger and acquisition history of the installation company was complicated. Because of that complicated history, Martin sued the incorrect company and did not realize who the responsible party was until after the statute of limitations period expired. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether Martin met the requirements of the rule that allowed such plaintiffs to add the correct defendant after the statute of limitations period expired, and whether her inability to identify the correct defendant was due to inexcusable neglect. The Court held that it was not: the record did not show that the proper defendant's identity was easily ascertainable by Martin during the limitations period. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Martin v. Dematic" on Justia Law

In 2006, a handicap access ramp platform at a residential construction site in Spanaway collapsed when plaintiff Jesse Powers used it. Powers fell while working for Awning Solutions, a company hired by Premier Communities Inc. to install an awning on a modular building. Premier also contracted with Pacific Mobile Structures Inc. to supply the ramp that collapsed. Unknown to Powers, Awning Solutions, or Premier, Pacific had subcontracted with W.B. Mobile to install the ramp that collapsed. After falling, Powers attempted to find out who "put the ramp the together," including making inquiries to Awning Solutions, but Awning Solutions thought that Pacific installed the ramp. In 2009, Powers filed a personal injury suit against Premier, Pacific, and John Doe One and John Doe Two, identifying "John Doe One" as the "builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred." The statute of limitations for Powers' suit expired on June 2, 2009. Powers timely served Pacific on June 5, 2009, and Premier on June 12, 2009. Powers did not serve the John Does or W.B. Mobile at that time. Finally, over a year after filing his complaint, Powers obtained a discovery response from Pacific in October 2010 identifying W.B. Mobile as the installer of the ramp. Four months after Pacific's discovery response, in February 2011, Powers moved to amend his pleading to replace John Doe One with "W.B. Mobile." The trial court granted W.B. Mobile's motion to dismiss for failure to bring claims within the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Powers' serving Pacific and Premier within ninety days of filing his complaint tolled the statute of limitations on Powers' claim against W.B. Mobile, and remanded for a trial on the merits. Finding no error with the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Powers v. WB Mobile Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After Theresa Scanlan filed a personal injury action against Karlin Townsend, a process server delivered a copy of the summons and complaint to Townsend's father at his home. But Townsend did not live at her father's home. Townsend's father later handed the summons and complaint directly to Townsend within the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed for lack of service, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Finding no error with the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Scanlan v. Townsend" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether, under Evidence Rules (ER) 702 through 705, the trial court properly admitted expert biomechanical testimony in an automobile collision case. In August 2006, Dawn Matsunaga rear-ended the car that Cathy Johnson-Forbes was riding in. Johnston-Forbes claimed that she suffered injuries as a result of the collision and sued Matsunaga. Before trial, Matsunaga identified Dr. Allan Tencer as an expert who would be testifying as a biomechanical engineer. In a motion in limine, Johnston-Forbes moved to exclude Tencer's testimony, arguing that he was not qualified as an engineer, that his opinion lacked sufficient foundation, and that in viewing photographs he could not account for Johnston-Forbes's precise body position at the time of impact. The trial court limited Tencer's testimony but denied Johnston-Forbes's motion, and the jury returned a verdict for Matsunaga. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Johnston-Forbes v. Matsunaga" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on proceedings to determine the fair value of shares in a closely held corporation. The primary question presented was whether the respondents, shareholders who disagreed with the corporation's estimate of that fair value, presented sufficient evidence to defeat the corporation's motion for summary judgment. Secondarily, the Court was asked to decide whether the trial court properly awarded attorney and expert fees to the corporation. After review, the Supreme Court held that respondents did not provide sufficient evidence to defeat the corporation's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court held respondents did not act in a manner that justified the trial court's award of fees to the corporation. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was reversed as to the summary judgment issue and affirmed as to the fees. View "SentinelC3 v. Hunt" on Justia Law

In this case and its companion, LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC,(No. 88132-4), the central issues on appeal arose from a joint venture agreement regarding a debt collection business. The debt collection business operated according to the terms of the joint venture agreement, as originally proposed, from approximately winter 2005 through summer 2007. In this opinion, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of equitable indemnification (known as the "ABC Rule") to hold that the legal malpractice plaintiffs here suffered no compensable damages as a matter of law and that summary judgment dismissal was appropriate. "Where the only damages claimed by a legal malpractice plaintiff are attorney fees incurred in a separate litigation and the only legal basis on which plaintiff asserts those fees are compensable is the ABC Rule, then the defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissal if the ABC Rule does not apply to the undisputed facts as a matter of law." That was the situation presented in this case, and as such, affirmed the trial court. View "LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

Ignacio Encarnacion and Norma Karla Farias were sued for unlawful detainer even though they had a valid lease and did nothing to warrant eviction. The case settled. They moved to amend the Superior Court Management Information System (SCOMIS) indices to replace their full names with their initials in order to hide the fact that they were defendants to the unlawful detainer action. Encarnacion and Farias argued that even though the unlawful detainer action was meritless, they could not obtain sufficient rental housing after prospective landlords learned that they had an unlawful detainer action filed against them. The superior court granted their motion and ordered that the indices be changed to show only their initials. The King County Superior Court Office of Judicial Administration objected and appealed the order. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed: "[a]lthough we sympathize with Encarnacion and Farias, and other renters in similar situations . . .[t]he public's interest in the open administration of justice prohibits the redaction of the indices in this case." View "Hundtofte v. Encarnacion" on Justia Law

Expedia (and several other hotel booking websites, collectively, "Petitioners") has been subject to approximately 80 underlying lawsuits by states, counties, and municipalities (collectively, taxing authorities) for purportedly failing to collect the right amount of local occupancy taxes from its hotel customers. Expedia tendered most of the suits to its insurer, Zurich, although some were tendered late. Zurich refused to defend Expedia on a number of grounds, including late tender and that the underlying suits may be excluded from the policies' coverage. The trial court declined to make a determination of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia, instead ordering discovery that Expedia claimed was prejudicial to the underlying actions. Petitioners sought adjudication of their summary judgment motion concerning their respective insurers' duty to defend them in cases brought by local taxing authorities. They further requested a stay of discovery in the coverage action that could prejudice them in the underlying litigation. Upon review of the matter, the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by delaying adjudication of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine Zurich's duty to defend Expedia in each of the 54 underlying cases subject to Expedia's motion. The trial court was furthermore ordered to stay discovery in the coverage action until it could make a factual determination as to which parts of discovery are potentially prejudicial to Expedia in the underlying actions. View "Expedia, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law