Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lorna Smith, an appointed member of the Washington Fish and Wildlife (WFW) Commission, also held an appointed position on the Jefferson County Planning Commission. The U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance Foundation, along with Marc Nelson and Kolby Schafer, filed a lawsuit against Smith, arguing that RCW 77.04.040 prohibits her from holding both positions simultaneously. The statute states that members of the WFW Commission cannot hold another state, county, or municipal elective or appointive office. Smith conceded that her position on the county planning commission is a county appointive position but disputed that it qualifies as an "office" under the statute.The Thurston County Superior Court reviewed the case and both parties moved for summary judgment. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, determining that the planning commission position is indeed a county appointive office under RCW 77.04.040. Consequently, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and ordered Smith to resign from her position on the county planning commission. Smith sought direct review of this decision, and Governor Jay Inslee filed an amicus brief supporting her.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the statutory interpretation of the term "office" in RCW 77.04.040. The court concluded that the term "office" refers to a position of authority, duty, or responsibility conferred by a governmental authority for a public purpose or to exercise a public function. Applying this definition, the court held that the Jefferson County Planning Commission is an "office" under the statute. Therefore, Smith is prohibited from holding both positions simultaneously. The court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Foundation v. Smith" on Justia Law

Cody Hart filed a petition to recall Skagit County Prosecuting Attorney Richard A. Weyrich, Skagit County Auditor Sandra F. Perkins, and Skagit County Sheriff Donald L. McDermott. Hart alleged that the officials vacated their offices by failing to file their official bonds before their new term began on January 1, 2023, among other charges. The petition was certified and transmitted by the Skagit County auditor, and Deputy Solicitor General Karl Smith was appointed to prepare the ballot synopses. The Skagit County Superior Court found the charges legally and factually insufficient to support a recall and denied Hart’s motion to amend the ballot synopses.The Skagit County Superior Court approved the ballot synopses but found the charges against all three officials legally and factually insufficient. The court determined that the officials had obtained their bonds before the new term began, and their failure to file the bonds on time did not demonstrate intent to violate the law. Additionally, the court found that the officials' actions did not constitute misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of their oath of office. Hart then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the charges were legally and factually insufficient, as Hart failed to show intent to violate the law or willful failure to secure a bond. The court also found that the officials' actions did not amount to misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of their oath of office. The court concluded that the officials' prior bonds were sufficient until their new bonds were filed, and their actions did not warrant removal from office. The court denied Hart’s various motions, including those for expedited declaratory judgment and recusal of the Chief Justice. View "In re Recall of Weyrich" on Justia Law

A child, Baby Boy B (BBB), was removed from his mother, JB, shortly after birth and placed in shelter care with his maternal grandmother. The King County Superior Court held shelter care hearings in April, May, and June, finding no contested issues and maintaining prior orders. The court then decided not to hold additional hearings unless there was a motion alleging a change in circumstances, based on King County Superior Court Local Juvenile Court Rule (LJuCR) 2.5.The trial court found that JB's requests for 30-day shelter care hearings were unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources, as her visits were unsupervised. The court stated it would hear motions under LJuCR 2.5 if new issues arose. On discretionary review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, interpreting the statute to not require monthly review hearings for continued shelter care and finding that LJuCR 2.5 was not contrary to RCW 13.34.065(7)(a)(i).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and concluded that RCW 13.34.065(7)(a)(i) requires trial courts to hold shelter care review hearings every 30 days while the dependency decision is pending, unless there is a valid waiver or agreed continuance. The court emphasized that ongoing judicial oversight is necessary to ensure the health, welfare, and safety of the child, and to hold parties accountable. The court found that King County LJuCR 2.5 was inconsistent with the statute. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Dependency of Baby Boy B." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Heather, who moved with her three children from Minnesota to Washington to escape domestic violence. After their arrival, the family experienced intermittent homelessness, and the children faced developmental and mental health challenges. Heather also struggled with mental health and substance abuse issues. The children's school reported potential physical abuse to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), leading to the children being placed in emergency shelter care.The King County Superior Court ordered the children into emergency shelter care, and the Court of Appeals denied review. Heather sought review of the shelter care order in the Washington Supreme Court. Department II of the Supreme Court reversed the shelter care order due to the State's failure to apply the "active efforts" standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). The case was remanded for further fact-finding. On remand, the trial court kept the children in shelter care, finding that returning them to Heather would place them in substantial and immediate danger.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether RCW 13.04.033(3) requires a lawyer to obtain "specific direction" from a client before seeking appellate review in child welfare cases. The court held that the statute does require such specific direction but does not mandate a separate sworn document or client signature. A notice of appeal or discretionary review filed under RAP 5.3 satisfies the requirement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, which had dismissed the review due to the lack of a sworn, signed statement from Heather. However, as the case was moot, the Supreme Court remanded it to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings. View "In re Dependency of A.H." on Justia Law

A trial court found that Yakima HMA LLC wrongfully withheld nearly $1.5 million in wages from its nurses over five years. In 2015, the Washington State Nurses Association (WSNA) filed a claim on behalf of 28 nurses, including Daniel Campeau. The trial court ruled in favor of WSNA, but years later, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed this decision, stating that WSNA lacked associational standing. Before the mandate was issued, Campeau filed a class action suit to recover the unpaid wages.The trial court agreed with Campeau, allowing the case to proceed under the doctrine of equitable tolling, reasoning that Campeau had diligently pursued his claims through the WSNA action and reasonably relied on the union to protect his rights. Yakima HMA appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that American Pipe tolling was not applicable in Washington and that equitable tolling was not warranted without evidence of bad faith or misconduct by Yakima HMA.The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case de novo. The court held that equitable tolling could be appropriate even without bad faith by the defendant when associational standing fails, and a member promptly files a follow-on class action. The court found that equitable tolling was consistent with the purposes of the underlying labor laws and statutes of limitations, and it would prevent an unjust windfall to Yakima HMA. Therefore, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Washington State Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the city of Sunnyside and several of its officials, alleging that the city's crime-free rental housing program (CFRHP) was being used to evict tenants without due process and that these evictions disproportionately impacted Latinx renters, women-headed households, and families with minor children. The city argued that the Attorney General lacked the authority to bring this suit, as the scope of the Attorney General's authority under RCW 43.10.030(1) limits their ability to act to matters that impact more people than those affected by the CFRHP. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the Attorney General did have the authority to bring the suit, as the case involved matters of public concern in which the state had an interest. The court also found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the city's enforcement of the CFRHP had a disparate impact on protected classes, and whether the individual respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Attorney General's claims under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, finding that the respondents were not landlords and therefore the Act did not apply to them. View "State v. City of Sunnyside" on Justia Law

In 2021, Lyra Jean Spencer filed a personal injury lawsuit against Franklin Hills Health-Spokane LLC. To serve the summons, her attorney hired a process server who, after learning that the registered agent was unavailable, served the documents to the company's human resources manager, Sheri Flavel. Franklin Hills filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that service on Flavel was improper as she was not authorized to accept service under RCW 4.28.080(9). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Spencer had not met her initial burden to show that service was proper.Spencer appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that Spencer had made a prima facie showing that service to Flavel was proper and the trial court erred in dismissing the case without first holding an evidentiary hearing to determine if Flavel was a “managing agent” or “office assistant” under RCW 4.28.080(9).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted Franklin Hills’s petition for review. The court concluded that the service statute is to be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of accomplishing service of process and notice to the defendant. The court held that a person may be a managing agent if they are in charge of a single department of the corporation’s business, even if their discretion is controlled somewhat by a superior, provided that they have substantial managerial responsibilities and authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court found that Flavel, as the human resources manager, met the definition of a managing agent under the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the lawsuit to proceed to discovery and trial. View "Spencer v. Franklin Hills Health-Spokane, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Terry Cousins' efforts to obtain public records related to her sister, who died while in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). Cousins alleged that the DOC's response to her public records request violated the Public Records Act (PRA). The main issue was whether Cousins' PRA action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.Previously, the DOC had responded to Cousins' request by producing multiple installments of records and then sent Cousins a letter in January 2019 stating that her request was "now closed". Cousins asked about specific records she believed were missing, and the DOC reopened Cousins' original PRA request to conduct an additional search, leading to the production of hundreds of pages of previously undisclosed responsive records, followed by a second letter stating that the request was "now closed" in June 2021.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the June 2021 closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive response to Cousins’ PRA request. The court ruled that Cousins' PRA action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cousins v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves AURC III LLC, an Oregon limited liability company, and several Washington and Delaware limited liability companies collectively referred to as Point Ruston. Point Ruston purchased a 97-acre former copper smelter and environmental clean-up site located on the Puget Sound waterfront in Ruston and Tacoma, Washington, for $169,000,000 and developed it in phases. To fund the second phase of development, Point Ruston negotiated a $66 million loan from American United Development Group, which created AURC III LLC to raise and manage funds from foreign investors seeking United States residency. After disbursing the full amount of the loan, AURC filed an amended complaint against Point Ruston, alleging that Point Ruston was delinquent on interest payments in breach of its loan agreement. The superior court ordered Point Ruston and AURC to engage in arbitration as per their loan agreement.The arbitrator issued an interim award only on the amount of current and default interest due and awarded $10,969,015 to AURC. The arbitrator then issued a final award for the same amount, as well as awarding attorney fees and arbitration fees and expenses. In total, Point Ruston was required to pay over $11.4 million. AURC moved to confirm the award and for presentation of judgment. Initially, Point Ruston agreed AURC was “entitled to confirmation of the Award and entry of a Final Judgment” but opposed attaching the arbitrator’s awards to that judgment. Before the court could enter the written confirmation order and judgment, Point Ruston paid the award and filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot because no live dispute remained. After AURC alerted the court that it received the award amount from Point Ruston, the court denied the motion to dismiss. The court entered the confirmation order with the interim and final awards attached as exhibits, as well as a judgment against Point Ruston. AURC filed a full satisfaction of judgment.Point Ruston appealed on two grounds. It challenged (1) the superior court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and (2) the court’s decision to attach the arbitration awards to the confirmation order. Division Two of the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Point Ruston sought review in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that when a party seeks a confirmation order, RCW 7.04A.220 requires issuance of the order subject to narrow exceptions inapplicable here. Payment of an arbitration award does not render the underlying case moot. The court also held that attaching an arbitrator’s award merely identifies the basis for the confirmation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase II, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, a consortium of over 130 institutions of higher education sued a group of 16 insurance carriers for denying their COVID-19 related claims. The insurance carriers had issued identical “all risk” property insurance policies to the institutions via the Educational & Institutional Insurance Administrators Inc. (EIIA). The colleges, including three in Washington, filed the suit in Pierce County Superior Court, Washington, seeking a declaratory judgment that their COVID-19 related losses were covered under the insurance policies. However, two of the defendant insurers filed a similar suit in Illinois, seeking a declaratory judgment that the losses were not covered by the policies.The insurers argued that the Washington court should dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens, asserting that Illinois was a more convenient forum due to the geographical distribution of the colleges. They also argued that the Illinois action should be allowed to proceed. The colleges, on the other hand, argued that the insurance policies' "suit against the company" clause allowed them to choose the forum and prohibited the insurers from seeking to alter that choice.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the lower court's decision, denying the motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and issuing an injunction against further proceedings in the Illinois action. The court held that the insurers had contractually agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of any court chosen by the insured and could not seek to transfer, change venue, or remove any lawsuit filed by the insured in such a court. The court also found that an injunction was appropriate under the circumstances to protect the colleges' contractual rights and prevent a manifest wrong and injustice. View "Pacific Lutheran Univ. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London" on Justia Law