Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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The case involves AURC III LLC, an Oregon limited liability company, and several Washington and Delaware limited liability companies collectively referred to as Point Ruston. Point Ruston purchased a 97-acre former copper smelter and environmental clean-up site located on the Puget Sound waterfront in Ruston and Tacoma, Washington, for $169,000,000 and developed it in phases. To fund the second phase of development, Point Ruston negotiated a $66 million loan from American United Development Group, which created AURC III LLC to raise and manage funds from foreign investors seeking United States residency. After disbursing the full amount of the loan, AURC filed an amended complaint against Point Ruston, alleging that Point Ruston was delinquent on interest payments in breach of its loan agreement. The superior court ordered Point Ruston and AURC to engage in arbitration as per their loan agreement.The arbitrator issued an interim award only on the amount of current and default interest due and awarded $10,969,015 to AURC. The arbitrator then issued a final award for the same amount, as well as awarding attorney fees and arbitration fees and expenses. In total, Point Ruston was required to pay over $11.4 million. AURC moved to confirm the award and for presentation of judgment. Initially, Point Ruston agreed AURC was “entitled to confirmation of the Award and entry of a Final Judgment” but opposed attaching the arbitrator’s awards to that judgment. Before the court could enter the written confirmation order and judgment, Point Ruston paid the award and filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot because no live dispute remained. After AURC alerted the court that it received the award amount from Point Ruston, the court denied the motion to dismiss. The court entered the confirmation order with the interim and final awards attached as exhibits, as well as a judgment against Point Ruston. AURC filed a full satisfaction of judgment.Point Ruston appealed on two grounds. It challenged (1) the superior court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and (2) the court’s decision to attach the arbitration awards to the confirmation order. Division Two of the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Point Ruston sought review in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that when a party seeks a confirmation order, RCW 7.04A.220 requires issuance of the order subject to narrow exceptions inapplicable here. Payment of an arbitration award does not render the underlying case moot. The court also held that attaching an arbitrator’s award merely identifies the basis for the confirmation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase II, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the death of a patient, Cindy Essex, who visited Samaritan Hospital's emergency room due to severe shoulder pain. The doctors, who were not employees of the hospital but independent contractors, failed to diagnose her necrotizing fasciitis, a severe soft-tissue infection, leading to her death within 24 hours. The estate of Cindy Essex sought to hold Samaritan Hospital liable for the doctors' alleged negligence under theories of nondelegable duty, inherent function, and agency law principles of delegation.The trial court denied the estate's motion for partial summary judgment concerning Samaritan’s potential vicarious liability for the doctors' alleged negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that ostensible agency is the sole basis for holding a hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of nonemployee physicians.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that statutes and regulations impose nondelegable duties on hospitals concerning the provision of emergency services. A hospital remains responsible for those nondelegable duties regardless of whether it performs those duties through its own staff or contracts with doctors who are independent contractors. The court also found that the estate provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment concerning its corporate negligence claim against Samaritan. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Essex v. Grant County Public Hospital District No. 1" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the State of Washington found that the initiation fees charged by Royal Oaks Country Club, a nonprofit corporation, are fully deductible from the business and occupation (B&O) tax under RCW 82.04.4282. The statute permits taxpayers to deduct "bona fide" initiation fees, among other things, from their B&O tax. The court held that these initiation fees were "bona fide" as they were paid solely for the privilege of membership, and did not automatically entitle a member to use any service or facility of the club. The court differentiated between dues and initiation fees, noting that the statute treats these two terms separately. The court rejected the Washington Department of Revenue's argument that a portion of the initiation fee was for access to facilities and thus not subject to the exemption, stating that there is a difference between access and use. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that Royal Oaks' initiation fees qualify as bona fide initiation fees and are therefore wholly deductible. View "Royal Oaks Country Club v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, an invitee, was allegedly injured by exposure to asbestos on the defendant landowner’s property. The landowner, petitioner ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (Mobil), requested a jury instruction to limit its potential liability for injuries caused by “known or obvious” dangers pursuant to § 343A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1965). The trial court declined to give the § 343A instruction, and the jury issued a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mobil argued that the jury should have been instructed on both §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement as a matter of law. According to Mobil, an instruction on § 343A was necessary to make the jury instructions complete and to allow Mobil to argue its theory of the case. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed: “it is well established that the issuance of jury instructions is ‘within the trial court’s discretion’ and that instructions on ‘a party’s theory of the case’ are not ‘required’ unless they are supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” View "Wright v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

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The State of Washington brought multiple claims alleging that TVI Inc., doing business as Value Village, used deceptive advertising and marketing in violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), ch. 19.86 RCW. TVI operated about 20 for-profit thrift stores in Washington under the name Value Village. Approximately 93 percent of Value Village’s retail inventory consisted of used goods donated by the community. To source these community donations, TVI contracted with third-party nonprofit organizations, which TVI called its “‘charity partners.’” By working with charity partners, TVI obtained inventory at a lower price than it would pay a for-profit supplier. The charity partners, in turn, received a predictable source of unrestricted funding, as well as publicity from TVI’s marketing. In 2013, the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General’s (AG’s) Office received a complaint from a Washington resident that TVI’s marketing gives the false impression that Value Village is a nonprofit. The AG wrote to TVI in November 2014, instructing it to register as a commercial fundraiser pursuant to the CSA. The AG’s November 2014 letter raised additional concerns that TVI’s “solicitations for charitable contributions and advertisements for its retail stores” were “misleading or deceptive” in violation of the CPA. By the summer of 2015, TVI had posted signs in its stores disclosing its status as a for-profit commercial fundraiser in its stores. Following three years of investigation, the State filed this lawsuit. TVI argued the State's claims infringed on its First Amendment right to solicit charitable contributions on behalf of nonprofit organizations. The Supreme Court agreed with TVI, and remanded this case to the trial court for dismissal of the State’s claims. View "Washington v. TVI, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Washington Department of Revenue issued instructions to Lakeside Industries Inc. regarding the valuation of Lakeside’s self-manufactured asphalt products. This valuation determined the amount of use tax that Lakeside had to pay to use its asphalt in public road construction projects. Lakeside did not follow DOR’s instructions and, instead, petitioned for judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 34.05 RCW. The Washington Supreme Court held that the APA’s general review provisions did not apply to Lakeside’s nonconstitutional tax challenge. To obtain judicial review of DOR’s tax reporting instructions, Lakeside had to follow the specific procedures for tax challenges set forth in Title 82 RCW (Title 82). Therefore, Lakeside’s APA petition for judicial review was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lakeside Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Six months after United States and global health authorities declared COVID-19 a public health emergency, the city of Seattle (City) passed an ordinance (Seattle Ordinance 126094) authorizing hazard pay for certain workers who delivered food to consumers’ homes. By that time, Governor Inslee had issued stay-at-home orders requiring Washingtonians to leave home only for the most essential of trips. Among some of the conditions in the ordinance were that food delivery network companies could not reduce workers’ compensation or otherwise limit their earning capacity as a result of the ordinance, and they were prohibited from reducing the areas of the City they served or to pass on the cost of the premium pay to customers’ charges for groceries. The Washington Food Industry Association and Maplebear Inc., d/b/a Instacart, challenged the ordinance, seeking a declaration invalidating the ordinance on statutory and state and federal constitutional grounds. The trial court dismissed the statutory claim under chapter 82.84 RCW but permitted all remaining claims to proceed. After review of the limited record, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) affirming dismissal of the 82.84 RCW claim; (2) reversing dismissal of the equal protection claim; and (3) reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the privileges and immunities claim. The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wash. Food Indus. Ass'n v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

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The United States Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. Cox Construction was the general contractor of a remodeling project. Cox hired Baker & Son Construction, Inc. as a subcontractor. A Baker employee allegedly caused a two-by-four to fall from a railing and strike Ronnie Cox, owner of Cox Construction, who later died from his injury. Baker allegedly called an insurance agent to alert them of the incident. The agent told Baker that no action needed to be taken because at that time, no claim existed. A few months later, Baker received a wrongful death claim from an attorney representing Cox’s widow. Baker notified its insurer, Preferred Contractors Insurance Company (PCIC) of the claim. PCIC denied coverage, but agreed to defend Baker under a reservation of rights. The certified question to the Washington Supreme Court related to the “claims-made” nature of the policy and the timing of Baker’s tender of Ms. Cox’s claim. The Supreme Court replied to the certified question that in light of RCW 18.27, a contractor’s commercial general liability insurance policy that requires the loss to occur and be reported within the same policy year, and provides neither neither prospective nor retroactive coverage violates Washington’s public policy. View "Preferred Contractors Ins. Co. v. Baker & Son Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the penalty for intentionally concealing the source of political contributions could be based on the amount concealed. Washington voters proposed and passed Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA or act), ch. 42.17A RCW. The FCPA compels disclosure and “compelled disclosure may encroach on First Amendment rights by infringing on the privacy of association and belief.” In 2012, California voters were presented with Proposition 37, which would have required some manufacturers to disclose whether packaged food contained genetically modified organisms (GMO). The Grocery Manufacturer’s Association (GMA) and many of its member companies successfully campaigned against Proposition 37, and some received negative responses from the public for doing so. In the wake of the Proposition 37 campaign, Washington sponsors filed Initiative 522, which also would have required GMO labels on packaged food. And like Proposition 37, GMA opposed it. GMA raised more than $14 million to oppose GMO labeling efforts. GMA in turn contributed $11 million to the “No on 522” campaign from the Defense of Brands strategic account. Despite its political activities in Washington, GMA did not register as a political committee with the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC) and did not make any PDC reports until after this lawsuit was filed. In response to the suit, GMA registered “under duress” but, as of the time of trial, still had not filed all of the required reports. The State sued, contending that GMA intentionally, flagrantly, and repeatedly violated the FCPA. The trial court specifically rejected testimony from GMA officers that they had not intended to violate the law, finding “it is not credible that GMA executives believed that shielding GMA’s members as the true source of contributions to GMA’s Defense of Brands Account was legal.” A majority of the Washington Supreme Court concluded GMA did not show that the trial court erred in imposing a punitive sanction under the FCPA based on the amount intentionally concealed. The Court thus affirmed the courts below and remanded for any further proceedings necessary. View "Washington v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n" on Justia Law

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This case involves the constitutionality of a business and occupation (B&O) tax. In 2019, the Washington state legislature imposed an additional 1.2 percent B&O tax on financial institutions with a consolidated net income of at least $1 billion. The tax applied to any financial institution meeting this threshold regardless of whether it was physically located in Washington, and it was apportioned to income from Washington business activity. The Washington Supreme Court found that because the tax applied equally to in- and out-of-state institutions and was limited to Washington-related income, it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The Court therefore reversed the trial court and upheld the constitutionality of the tax. View "Washington Bankers Ass'n v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law