Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Bankruptcy
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Plaintiffs Matthew and Melanie Nelson (collectively Nelsons) married in 2020. The following year, defendant Puget Sound Collections Inc. (PSC), a debt collection agency, garnished Matthew’s wages in an attempt to satisfy a 2014 default judgment against him and his former wife, stemming from her medical expenses. The Nelsons argued RCW 26.16.200 required any eligible debt be reduced to judgment within the three years before and the three years after the marriage. In their view, the marital bankruptcy statute barred PSC from garnishing Matthew’s wages because the 2014 judgment was entered too soon and not “within three years” of their 2020 marriage. In contrast, PSC argued “within three years of the marriage” simply meant “not later in time than three years after the marriage.” Under this interpretation, PSC lawfully garnished Matthew’s wages because it reduced the debt to judgment not later than three years after the Nelsons’ marriage. The federal appellate court certified questions of Washington law in this case about the so-called marital bankruptcy statute, RCW 26.16.200. The Washington Supreme Court found that while the Nelsons’ interpretation might hold “some logical appeal, and their situation is certainly sympathetic, only PSC’s interpretation of RCW 26.16.200 effectuates the purpose of the statute to provide limited debt collection relief to diligent creditors.” The Court answered the first and second certified questions based on the statute’s plain language and held that “within” in this context means “not later in time than” three years of the marriage. “This interpretation permits wage garnishment where, as here, the creditor had reduced the debt to judgment more than three years before the marriage.” As to the additional certified question, which asked whether Washington law placed any limitation on the amount of wages subject to garnishment, the Nelsons correctly conceded this issue. The Supreme Court held that where other statutory requirements are met, RCW 26.16.200 permitted a creditor to garnish the entirety of the debtor spouse’s wages. View "Nelson v. P.S.C., Inc." on Justia Law

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Gary and Jeanette Merritt own four residential properties in Marysville, Washington. Between 2005 and 2007, the Merritts opened five home equity lines of credit (HELOCs), executing five five promissory notes (notes or HELOC agreements) in favor of USAA Federal Savings Bank. The Merritts secured these loans by executing deeds of trust on the properties with USAA as the beneficiary. In November 2012, the Merritts filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Merritts stopped making their monthly payments on the USAA loans prior to the November 2012 bankruptcy filing. USAA never accelerated any of the loans or acted to foreclose on the properties. In 2020, the Merritts filed four quiet title complaints seeking to remove USAA’s liens on each of the properties. Relying on Edmundson v. Bank of America, NA, 378 P.3d 272 (2016), the Merritts argued that the six-year statute of limitations to enforce the deeds of trust expired six years after February 12, 2013, the day before their bankruptcy discharge. In October 2020, the Merritts moved for summary judgment in each case. In November 2020, the trial court denied each of these motions. In February 2021, USAA moved for summary judgment in each case. USAA argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to quiet title because the statute of limitations to foreclose on the deeds of trust would not begin to run until the maturity date of each loan, the earliest of which will occur in 2025. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the the six-year statute of limitations had not begun to run on enforcement of the deeds of trust since none of the loans had yet matured. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether a bankruptcy discharge triggered the statute of limitations to enforce a deed of trust. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the trial court and hold that bankruptcy discharge did not trigger the statute of limitations to enforce a deed of trust. View "Merritt v. USAA Federal Savings Bank" on Justia Law

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The property at issue in this case was a residential home that was purchased in 2007 by Shawn and Stephanie Kurtz. The house was located in a subdivision, which required property owners to pay homeowners association (HOA) assessments to petitioner Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Association. If the assessments were not paid, then Copper Creek was entitled to foreclose on its lien. However, Copper Creek’s lien was “subordinate to any security interest perfected by a first deed of trust or mortgage granted in good faith and for fair value upon such Lot.” The Kurtzes stopped paying their HOA assessments and the home loan in varying times in 2010. The Kurtzes (in the process of divorcing) individually filed for bankruptcy. Neither returned to the house, nor did they make any further payments toward their home loan or their HOA assessments. However, there was no attempt to foreclose on the deed of trust. As a result, the house sat vacant for years and fell into disrepair. The Kurtzes remained the property owners of record and HOA assessments continued to accrue in their names. In 2018, Copper Creek recorded a notice of claim of lien for unpaid HOA assessments, fees, costs, and interest. In January 2019, Copper Creek filed a complaint against the Kurtzes seeking foreclosure on the lien and a custodial receiver for the property. The issue this case presented concerned the statute of limitations to foreclose on a deed of trust securing an installment loan after the borrower receives an order of discharge in bankruptcy. As detailed in Merritt v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, No. 100728-1 (Wash. July 20, 2023), the Washington Supreme Court held that a new foreclosure action on the deed of trust accrues with each missed installment payment, even after the borrower’s personal liability is discharged. Actions on written contracts are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the nonjudicial foreclosure action on the deed of trust in this case was timely commenced as to all unpaid installments within the preceding six years, regardless of the borrowers’ bankruptcy discharge orders. In addition, the Court held the trial court properly exercised its discretion to award fees as an equitable sanction for respondents’ litigation misconduct. View "Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Ass'n v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

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The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified two questions to the Washington Supreme Court about the application of RCW 49.52.050, the wage rebate act (WRA), in circumstances of chapter 7 bankruptcy: (1) whether an officer, vice principal, or agent of an employer liable for a deprivation of wages under RCW 49.52.050 when his or her employment with the employer (and his or her ability to control the payment decision) was terminated before the wages became due and owing; and (2) whether an officer, vice principal, or agent's participation in the decision to file the Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition that effectively terminated his or her employment and ability to control payment decisions alter the analysis. The Washington Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative: (1) officers, vice principals, or agents may be held personally liable under the WRA, even if the payday date for those wages came after the employer filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy; and (2) an officer's participation in the decision to file the chapter 7 bankruptcy petition tends to show a willful withholding of wages-the second element required by the WRA. View "Allen v. Dameron" on Justia Law

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Washington orchardists Harold and Shirley Ostenson (collectively Ostenson) and California organic fruit broker Greg Holzman (d/b/a Greg Holzman, Inc. (GHI)) formed Pac Organic Fruit LLC (Pac-O) in 1998. The business operated from 1998 through 2004 but collapsed in 2005. During 2005, Pac-O defaulted on its operating line of credit and lease payments, Holzman fired Ostenson, and the bank foreclosed on the packing facility. Thereafter, Holzman, acting as Pac-O's agent, executed a demand promissory note in favor of GHI and transferred Pac-O' s assets to GHI to satisfy the note. In early 2007, Ostenson filed a voluntary chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Later that year, a creditor of Pac-O, Northwest Wholesale Inc., filed this action against Pac-O, Ostenson, and GHI, alleging a fraudulent conveyance from Pac-O to GHI. Ostenson filed cross claims and/or third party claims against Pac-O, Holzman, GHI, and Total Organic LLC (another Holzman company). Ostenson claimed Holzman and his companies (collectively Holzman defendants or HDs) were as a derivative action on behalf of Pac-O. The trial court dismissed Northwest Wholesale's claims following a settlement. Thereafter, the only remaining claims were Ostenson's responsive claims against Pac-O (seven counts) and his derivative claim (count VIII) against HDs. The trial court: (1) rejected Ostenson's contention that HDs had waived a CR 41 motion by putting on evidence; (2) rejected Ostenson's contention that HDs had consented to the derivative action in the stipulation in Ostenson's bankruptcy proceeding; and (3) ruled that Ostenson relinquished membership in Pac-O with his bankruptcy filing. Ostenson moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that federal bankruptcy law preempted the Washington Limited Liability Company Act (WALLCA, chapter 25.15 RCW) regarding dissociation of LLC members upon filing bankruptcy. The trial court denied Ostenson's motion. Ostenson appealed, and Division Three affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the dissociation provision found in RCW 25.15. 13 0(1)(d) was not preempted by federal bankruptcy law and affirmed the dismissal of the former LLC member's derivative claim under the facts of this case. View "Nw. Wholesale, Inc. v. Pac Organic Fruit, LLC" on Justia Law

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The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The question centered on Washington's homestead exemption law, chapter 6.13 RCW, and whether it applied extraterritorially to real property located in other states. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: Washington's homestead exemption law did not apply to real property outside of Washington. View "In re Bankr. Pet. of Wieber" on Justia Law

Posted in: Bankruptcy