Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell
The federal district court in Washington State certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. Washington law required group life insurance policies to have an incontestability clause providing that “the validity of the policy shall not be contested, except for nonpayment of premiums, after it has been in force for two years from its date of issue.” The certified question in this case asked whether an insurer could invalidate a life insurance policy after this two-year period on grounds that the policies were void ab initio or never “in force.” New York Life Insurance (NY Life) issued two life insurance policies to Lorenzo Mitchell, naming his nephew, Simon Mitchell, as the sole beneficiary. Lorenzo died more than two years after the policies were issued, and Simon sought to collect on the policies. NY Life became aware that Lorenzo had Down syndrome and lived with significant intellectual disabilities. These facts raised questions about the circumstances under which the policies were issued. NY Life sued Simon in federal district court seeking declaratory relief that the policies were void ab initio under three possible theories: imposter fraud, incapacity, and lack of an insurable interest. The Washington Supreme Court concluded NY Life’s first and third claims were not barred by that provision. “In contrast, lack of capacity does not, on its own, render an insurance contract void; it renders it at most voidable. Because a voidable contract is not void ab initio, we hold the incontestability provision bars NY Life’s second claim.” View "New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell" on Justia Law
In re Pers. Restraint of Rhone
Petitioner Theodore Rhone asked the Washington Supreme Court to adopt a bright line rule establishing a prima facie case of discrimination when the State peremptorily strikes the last member of a racially cognizable group from a jury venire. “Without the benefit of the considerable knowledge we have gained regarding the impact of implicit bias in jury selection,” a “fractured” majority of the Supreme Court declined to adopt Rhone’s proposed rule in 2010. But seven years later, it did, in City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (2017). Although this case came to the Supreme Court as a personal restraint petition (PRP), the central issue was the Court’s 2010 decision in Rhone’s own case. The Supreme Court took the opportunity here to revisit and correct that decision. “Given the unique factual and procedural history of this case and in the interest of justice,” the Court recalled its prior mandate, reversed Rhone’s convictions, and remanded for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Rhone" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Washington v. Shoop
Petitioner Denver Lee Shoop kept a small herd of eight bison on his property. The State charged him with eight counts of animal cruelty in the first degree for his treatment of those eight bison. RCW 16.52.205(2) stated that one commits “animal cruelty in the first degree” when “he or she, with criminal negligence, starves, dehydrates, or suffocates an animal…” and causes considerably suffering or death. The State included “starves, dehydrates, or suffocates” in each of the eight counts. The jury convicted Shoop as charged, but without specifying which of those three means the State actually proved. Shoop appealed, arguing in part that RCW 16.52.205(2) constituted an “alternative means” crime, so either (1) the jury had to achieve unanimity about which means the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) the record had to show that sufficient evidence supported each of those multiple means. The Washington Supreme Court held RCW 16.52.205(2) described a single crime of animal cruelty in the first degree. “That statutory subsection’s list of ways of committing animal cruelty—negligently starving, dehydrating, or suffocating—constitute “minor nuances inhering in the same act [or omission],” not completely different acts, i.e., not “alternative means.” View "Washington v. Shoop" on Justia Law
Kenmore MHP LLC v. City Of Kenmore
The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the Washington Growth Management Hearings Board’s (“Board”) decision to dismiss a timely petition for review was arbitrary and capricious when it found that the petitioner did not substantially comply with the service requirements under WAC 242-03-230(2)(a) without considering prejudice. The City of Kenmore argued and the Court of Appeals held that the Board’s interpretation of substantial compliance derived from Your Snoqualmie Valley v. City of Snoqualmie, No. 11-3-0012 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Mar. 8, 2012 (Ord. on Mots.)), was entitled to deference, that the definition did not require a finding of prejudice, and that the Board’s application of the test for substantial compliance to the facts in this case was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the Board’s erroneous interpretation and application of the substantial compliance standard articulated in the prior Board decision constituted arbitrary and capricious action and that the petitioners substantially complied with the service requirements. View "Kenmore MHP LLC v. City Of Kenmore" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Washington v. Hubbard
A trial court granted Jeremy Dustin Hubbard’s motion to modify a court-imposed community custody condition approximately 15 years after sentencing based on a change in Hubbard’s factual circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Washington Supreme Court found the current statutory framework did not contain a provision authorizing Hubbard’s requested modification. "Outside a direct appeal or a timely collateral attack, a trial court cannot modify court-imposed community custody conditions after sentencing without express statutory authority to do so." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court to vacate its order. View "Washington v. Hubbard" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
In re Recall of Bird, et al.
In early 2022, while Washington Governor Jay Inslee’s COVID-19 related mask mandate remained binding throughout the state, three of five Richland School District board (RSDB) members voted to make face coverings optional in Richland schools. This vote conflicted directly with the then effective statewide masking requirement. Two months later, a group of Richland voters filed petitions to recall those three RSDB members. The petitioners alleged that the three RSDB members violated the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 RCW, and knowingly violated state law in different ways when they voted to lift the mask mandate from the Richland schools. The trial court agreed that many of the counts containing those allegations were factually and legally sufficient to be placed on the ballot for the voters to decide. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with most of the trial court’s decisions. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopses 1, 3, and 5: petitioners sufficiently alleged that the RSDB members knowingly violated both the OPMA and the statewide mask mandate. But the Court reversed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopsis 4: the aspirational, nonbinding, RSDB “Code of Ethics” could not form the legal basis for a recall charge. View "In re Recall of Bird, et al." on Justia Law
In re Dependency of A.M.F.
A child was removed from his mother and placed with his grandparents out of concern that she could not care for him. Years later, the State sought to terminate that mother’s parental rights. On advice of counsel, she declined to answer questions related to her recent drug use. The trial judge chose to draw a negative inference from her assertion of that right. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether, under the Fifth Amendment, that was permissible. The Court stressed that such a negative inference could not be the only evidence supporting termination. Here, the Supreme Court concluded the trial coud did not err by drawing a negative inference from the mother’s refusal to answer specific questions about her drug use. View "In re Dependency of A.M.F." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Family Law
Quinn, et al. v. Washington
Two groups of plaintiffs, the Quinn and Clayton plaintiffs (Plaintiffs), brought suit to facially invalidate a capital gains tax enacted by the Washington legislature on three independent constitutional grounds. They principally claimed the tax was a property tax on income, in violation of the uniformity and levy limitations on property taxes imposed by article VII, sections 1 and 2 of the Washington Constitution. They also claimed the tax violated the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution and the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The State argued that it was a valid excise tax not subject to article VII’s uniformity and levy requirements, and that it was consistent with other state and federal constitutional requirements. The trial court concluded the tax was a property tax, and did not address the constitutional questions. But the Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding the capital gains tax was appropriately characterized as an excise because it is levied on the sale or exchange of capital assets, not on capital assets or gains themselves. "Because the capital gains tax is an excise tax under Washington law, it is not subject to the uniformity and levy requirements of article VII. We further hold the capital gains tax is consistent with our state constitution’s privileges and immunities clause and the federal dormant commerce clause." View "Quinn, et al. v. Washington" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Tax Law
Hanson v. Carmona
This case arose from a car accident in which respondenr Miriam Gonzalez Carmona ran a red light and hit petitioner Kylie Hanson’s car. At the time, Carmona was driving home from an out of town work training, driving a car owned by her employer, Southeast Washington Office of Aging and Long Term Care (SEW ALTC). Hanson filed a complaint against Carmona individually and the SEW ALTC Advisory Council (Advisory Council), under a theory of vicarious liability alleging Carmona was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Advisory Council and Carmona moved for summary judgment because Hanson did not comply with RCW 4.96.020(4)’s presuit notice requirement to sue a government entity or its employees for tortious conduct and the statute of limitations had run. Hanson then amended her complaint to remove all references to the Advisory Council and the allegations that Carmona was acting in the scope of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Advisory Council, but it allowed the case to proceed forward against Carmona in her individual capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that RCW 4.96.020(4) applied when an employee is acting within the scope of employment but is sued in their individual capacity. "The plain language of the statute encompasses acts within the scope of employment and the government entity, not the employee, is bound by any judgment, even if not technically sued. Accordingly, the legislature can require presuit notices for employee acts committed within the scope of employment." View "Hanson v. Carmona" on Justia Law
Washington v. Meredith
In 2018, Petitioner Zachery Meredith boarded a “Swift Blue Line” bus in Snohomish County. Swift buses used a “barrier-free payment-system[ ].” Snohomish County Sheriff’s Deputy Thomas Dalton and his partner were also on the Swift Blue Line that day, conducting fare enforcement pursuant to RCW 36.57A.235. In addition to the two deputies, a third officer was “in his patrol car, following [the bus] and acting as the back-up officer.” Meredith was already on the bus when Dalton and his partner boarded the bus; Dalton “never observed [Petitioner] getting on the bus without paying,” either in person or on video. In accordance with his “general practice,” Dalton requested “‘proof of payment or ORCA card’” from each passenger on the bus. On this particular day, Meredith was one of three individuals who “was not able to present proof of fare payment,” so “[u]pon reaching the next stop, Deputy Dalton detained [Meredith] outside at the bus platform.” Meredith “did not possess any identification documents,” but he gave the deputy a name and birth date, which turned out to be false. Rather than issuing a “civil infraction[ ]” for Meredith’s failure to provide proof of payment, the deputy “believed he had probable cause to arrest [Meredith] for theft in the third degree.” The officers ultimately learned he had two outstanding arrest warrants, for which Meredith was arrested and taken to jail. The State charged Meredith with a gross misdemeanor for making “a false or misleading material statement to a public servant.” Meredith unsuccessfully moved to suppress, contending the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion a crime had been committed. The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether Meredith was "disturbed in his private affairs" by the particular method of fare enforcement used here and, if so, whether this disturbance complied with article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Based on the totality of the circumstances presented, a majority of the Court held Meredith was unlawfully seized. Thus, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Meredith" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law