Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an individual who pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation and was sentenced to prison and a term of community custody. As a part of his community custody conditions, the trial court prohibited him from possessing or accessing “sexually exploitive materials (as defined by Defendant’s treating therapist or [Community Corrections Officer]).” The condition did not define “sexually exploitive materials,” nor did it reference any statute or provide illustrative examples. The defendant argued that this condition was unconstitutionally vague.The Washington Court of Appeals, in a split decision, upheld the condition. The majority reasoned that two statutes—though not referenced in the condition or the defendant’s proceedings—could provide sufficient clarity as to what “sexually exploitive materials” meant. The dissent, however, found that the phrase was undefined, not clarified by the referenced statutes (which described different crimes or phrases), and thus failed to give ordinary people notice of what conduct was prohibited.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court concluded that the community custody condition was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define “sexually exploitive materials,” provide statutory or case law definitions, or include clarifying examples. The court emphasized that due process requires conditions to be clear enough for an ordinary person to understand what is prohibited and to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Furthermore, because the condition implicated First Amendment rights, it also had to be narrowly tailored and directly related to the state’s goals of public safety and rehabilitation. The court found that the condition failed these requirements and reversed the Court of Appeals, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held specifically that the condition as written does not provide constitutional notice, does not protect against arbitrary enforcement, and is not narrowly tailored. View "State v. Jeffries-Porter" on Justia Law

Several residents of Skagit County sought to recall the county prosecuting attorney and three county commissioners. Their charges did not allege any misconduct related to the officials’ own oaths of office, but instead focused on alleged defects in the filing of oaths by other public servants, such as judges, a court commissioner, and deputy prosecuting attorneys. The recall petitions advanced five theories, including claims that the elected officials had a duty to address purported failures by others to timely file oaths, that paying salaries to these officials constituted a loss of public funds, and that election law violations were improperly handled. The evidence showed that the officials whose oaths were questioned had, in fact, taken oaths, and there was no statutory requirement for some of the filings alleged.The recall charges were initially reviewed in the Skagit County Superior Court by visiting judges. Each judge found the charges legally and factually insufficient, determining that the allegations lacked a basis in law or fact, and dismissed the recall petitions. The court found the recall efforts were intentionally frivolous and coordinated to harass the elected officials, imposing joint and several sanctions totaling $5,348.22 against six of the seven residents who filed charges. One appellant was not sanctioned due to his conduct at the hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the consolidated appeals de novo. The court held that all charges were legally and factually insufficient, as no law imposed a duty on the elected officials to ensure other public servants’ oaths were properly filed, nor was there evidence of intentional misconduct or loss of public funds. The court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal and sanctions, finding substantial evidence of coordinated harassment. Additionally, the Supreme Court awarded attorney fees to the elected officials for the appeal. View "In re Recall of Weyrich" on Justia Law

Several individuals alleged that a hospital violated Washington’s privacy statute by using Meta Pixel technology on its public website. When these individuals searched for information or clicked links on the hospital’s website, Meta Pixel tracked their activity and sent the data to Meta Platforms, which then used the information for targeted advertising. The plaintiffs argued that this tracking amounted to intercepting or recording “private communications” under the Washington Privacy Act (WPA), and asserted their searches on the hospital’s website were protected communications.A putative class action was filed in the King County Superior Court. The hospital moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs' activities on its public website did not constitute “private communication[s]” under the WPA, and that Meta Pixel was not installed on the hospital’s patient portal. The trial court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss with prejudice. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the plaintiffs’ website searches were unilateral actions and not “private communication[s]” between two or more individuals as required by the WPA.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that the WPA provision at issue applies only to communications “between two or more individuals,” and excludes interactions between an individual and an automated system operated by a corporation. Because the plaintiffs’ activities involved only a single individual and an automated corporate server, the court concluded the WPA did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint. View "Baker v. Seattle Child.'s Hosp." on Justia Law

After suffering catastrophic injuries during a surgery at a hospital, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the hospital and the lead surgeon. During its investigation, the hospital identified three nonparty doctors who had participated in the surgery and who might have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. These doctors were no longer employed by the hospital, but the hospital remained contractually obligated to defend and indemnify them. Without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent, the hospital communicated with these doctors outside the formal discovery process. Additionally, a member of the hospital's quality improvement committee, also the chief medical officer, engaged in conversations regarding the case with one of these doctors.The case was first reviewed by the King County Superior Court, where the plaintiff sought sanctions, including default judgment, and moved to compel production of communications and quality improvement materials. The trial court found that the hospital had violated the rule against ex parte communications with the plaintiff's nonparty doctors but denied default judgment, citing insufficient information to determine substantial prejudice. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to compel production of quality improvement materials, maintaining the statutory privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding that the hospital's ex parte communications violated established rules, that the plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating prejudice, and that the failure to screen the quality improvement committee member did not waive the statutory privilege.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the hospital violated the rule prohibiting ex parte communications with the plaintiff's nonparty doctors and rejected the hospital's arguments for exceptions. The Court further held that prejudice is presumed when this rule is violated, and plaintiffs do not bear the burden to prove litigation prejudice to obtain relief. Regarding the quality improvement privilege, the Court concluded that by failing to screen a committee member involved in litigation, the hospital at least partially waived the statutory privilege. The Court vacated the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motions and remanded for further proceedings, including in camera review of relevant materials. View "Snyder v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

A group of organizations and individuals challenged the constitutionality of a statewide initiative approved by Washington voters in November 2024. The initiative, known as I-2066, enacted broad changes to energy regulation, including requirements for utilities and local governments to ensure natural gas access, restrictions on local air quality regulators, removal of zero-emission goals from state law, amendments to the Decarbonization Act, and limitations on the state building code council’s authority regarding gas usage and transitions away from fossil fuels.The King County Superior Court reviewed the case following cross-motions for summary judgment by the parties. The court declared I-2066 unconstitutional in its entirety, finding that it violated three constitutional requirements: it impermissibly encompassed more than one subject, failed to include its subjects in the title, and failed to set forth the laws it amended. This judgment was appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the superior court’s ruling de novo. The court held that I-2066 violated the single-subject requirement of article II, section 19 of the Washington Constitution. It found that the initiative combined several distinct subjects with separate regulatory effects, lacking the necessary rational unity among its provisions. The court concluded that the provisions introducing distinct subjects were not severable and thus rendered the entire initiative unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment on the narrower ground of the single-subject violation and did not address the other constitutional arguments raised. View "Climate Sols. v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Karen Peterson in 2015 with felony possession of a controlled substance. To avoid conviction, Peterson entered the Snohomish County Adult Drug Treatment Court program, agreeing to pay a nonrefundable $900 participation fee and waiving her rights to a speedy trial and a jury. Upon her successful completion of the program, the trial court dismissed the charges with prejudice in 2017. Four years later, the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Blake, ruled the simple drug possession statute unconstitutional. Peterson, who was never convicted, sought relief under CrR 7.8, requesting a refund of her drug court fee and vacatur of the dismissed charge.The Snohomish County Superior Court granted Peterson’s request, vacating the charge and ordering the State to refund the $900 fee. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that CrR 7.8 did not authorize vacatur because Peterson was not convicted, and the fee was not a legal financial obligation (LFO) imposed as part of a criminal sentence. The appellate court also ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion by exceeding its authority under the rule, Blake, and the relevant statute.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It held that Peterson could use CrR 7.8(b)(5) to seek relief from the order requiring her to pay the drug court fee, as the rule applies to orders as well as judgments. However, the Court found that federal due process protections do not require refund of the fee because it was paid voluntarily as part of an agreement to avoid conviction, not as a consequence of an unconstitutional conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court in part, affirming that Peterson could seek relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5), but denied her claim for a refund on the merits. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law

A woman was fatally shot by a police officer during an attempt to execute an arrest warrant for a passenger in her car. Her mother brought suit against the officers involved and the city employing them, alleging that one officer acted negligently and that the city was vicariously liable for his actions because he acted within the scope of his employment. After the discovery phase, the plaintiff learned of prior domestic violence allegations against the second officer, which led her to add claims that his actions also contributed to the fatality and that the city negligently retained him despite knowing he was unfit for duty.The Pierce County Superior Court allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint to include a negligent retention claim and reopened discovery. The City of Tacoma challenged that decision. The trial court certified the question to the Washington Court of Appeals, which held that because the city conceded the officers were acting within the scope of employment, the negligent retention claim was superfluous and could not be brought alongside the vicarious liability claim. The plaintiff then sought review of this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that negligent retention and vicarious liability are distinct causes of action that may be pleaded together, even when an employer concedes its employee acted within the scope of employment. The court clarified that a scope of employment inquiry is not part of negligent retention analysis and overruled lower appellate cases to the extent they held otherwise. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court. View "Earl v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Three commissioners of the Port of Benton—Scott Keller, William O’Neil, and Lori Stevens—were the subject of recall petitions filed by Benton County voters. The petitions alleged thirteen counts of misconduct for each commissioner, largely focusing on actions attributed to Keller, some of which occurred before he was elected commissioner. The essential allegations that occurred during their terms as commissioners were that the three retaliated against the Port’s executive director, Diahann Howard, by suspending her after she raised complaints leading to an investigation of Keller, and that they retaliated against the Port’s finance director, Alicia Myers, by terminating her after she released the investigation report. Additionally, Keller alone was accused of failing to disclose his ownership interest in an LLC with a lease from the Port, as required by state law.A Benton County Superior Court judge reviewed the recall petitions, dismissing most of the thirteen charges against each commissioner as legally or factually insufficient. However, the court found two charges—retaliation against Howard and Myers—factually and legally sufficient against all three commissioners, and found the failure to disclose financial information charge factually and legally sufficient against Keller alone. The recall proponents did not appeal the dismissal of other charges, and the commissioners appealed the sufficiency findings to the Washington Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the trial court’s rulings in all respects. The court held that the charges of retaliation for whistleblowing and failure to disclose material financial interests stated factually and legally sufficient grounds for recall under the Washington Constitution and statutes. Specifically, the court found that actual or threatened retaliation constitutes misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office, and that intentional nondisclosure of required financial information by an elected official is legally sufficient to support recall. The court’s disposition allows these charges to proceed to the voters. View "In re Recall of O'Neil" on Justia Law

After a fatal collision involving a dirt bike, the defendant was charged with vehicular homicide. At the scene, he took a portable breath test after removing a lump of chewing tobacco from his mouth, as instructed by law enforcement. Later, at the jail, the defendant agreed to a Draeger breath test. Before administering this test, the officer asked if he had any foreign substances in his mouth, and the defendant denied it. However, the officer observed tiny strands of tobacco stuck in the defendant’s teeth, which were not removed prior to the test. The breath test results showed an alcohol level above the legal limit.The defendant moved in Stevens County Superior Court to suppress the breath test results, arguing the presence of tobacco strands meant the State failed to show there were no foreign substances in his mouth as required by law. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion, relying on the defendant’s denial of having foreign substances and testimony from both the officer and a State expert who indicated the small tobacco strands would not affect the test’s reliability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that an officer can rely on a subject’s denial unless aware of a foreign substance, and distinguished between a lump of tobacco and tiny strands for admissibility purposes.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the State met its burden of producing prima facie evidence that the defendant did not have any foreign substances in his mouth at the start of the observation period, as required by former RCW 46.61.506(4)(a)(iii), by presenting expert testimony that the tiny tobacco strands would not affect the reliability of the breath test. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Sliger" on Justia Law

A mother and father, previously married and now divorced, share a young daughter. Following their divorce, the superior court established a phased parenting plan in which the father’s residential time with the child would gradually increase as the child aged. At the time relevant to this case, the parties were in the third phase of the plan: the father had six overnights with the child every two weeks, but the plan anticipated that, once the child reached kindergarten, both parents would share residential time equally.Nearly two years after the parenting plan was set, the mother notified the father of her intent to move with the child to Virginia. The mother cited personal reasons for the move and invoked a statutory presumption favoring relocation, arguing that, under the current phase of the plan, she had more than 55 percent of the residential time. The father objected to the relocation, and the case proceeded to trial in the Superior Court for Clark County. The trial court calculated residential time over the entire anticipated life of the parenting plan—including future phases—and concluded that the father would have over 45 percent of the time overall, which meant the presumption favoring relocation did not apply. The court ultimately denied the mother’s request to relocate with the child.On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s approach, holding that residential time should be measured using the entire parenting plan, including future phases not yet in effect. The Washington Supreme Court granted review to resolve how residential time should be calculated under the Child Relocation Act when a phased parenting plan is in place.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that, for phased parenting plans, courts must calculate residential time based on the phase in effect when the notice of intent to relocate is served, not on anticipated future phases. The court reversed the decision below and remanded for further factual findings using this standard. View "In re Marriage of Hauk" on Justia Law