Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case centers on the conviction of an individual for felony harassment after a series of threatening communications directed at a long-time acquaintance, A.D. The events unfolded after a falling out and subsequent reconciliation between the two, which quickly deteriorated. On the day in question, A.D. testified to receiving a barrage of threatening calls and messages from the defendant, including explicit threats to kill her. Law enforcement was involved when A.D. reported the threats, with officers witnessing continued harassing calls and hearing threats made over the phone. The defendant was arrested near A.D.’s home and denied making any threats.The Superior Court for Pierce County conducted a jury trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of felony harassment but acquitted him of a stalking charge. The instructions to the jury defined a “true threat” based on what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would foresee, employing a negligence standard regarding the defendant’s awareness of how his words would be perceived. The defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Counterman v. Colorado, which held that “recklessness,” not negligence, is the minimum required mental state for criminalizing true threats under the First Amendment.The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the state’s harassment statute was not facially unconstitutional and that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon further review, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the statute is facially constitutional because it does not preclude application of a recklessness standard. However, the court found that the jury was incorrectly instructed regarding mens rea and remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the clarified standard in State v. Magaña-Arévalo. View "State v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Several individuals facing involuntary civil commitment under Washington’s Involuntary Treatment Act were entitled to appointed counsel. The King County Department of Public Defense (DPD) was responsible for providing this representation. During the spring and summer of 2024, DPD’s attorneys assigned to these cases reached their annual caseload limits, which are set by state standards. Despite having sufficient funding, DPD was unable to recruit additional attorneys and therefore notified the court when it could not assign counsel to new cases without exceeding the limits. When the court ordered DPD to provide counsel, DPD complied. The King County Executive was also ordered by the trial court to provide counsel, although in King County, only DPD has that authority.The King County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and subsequently issued orders requiring both DPD and the King County Executive to provide counsel to respondents. The court’s amended orders clarified that the decision of which attorney to appoint, and how to allocate caseloads, rested with DPD and the Executive, not with the court. Both DPD and the King County Executive sought review in the Washington Supreme Court. The Executive argued it should not be included in the orders due to the county’s charter, which provides DPD with exclusive authority and independence. DPD argued the orders effectively required it to violate mandatory caseload limits.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the caseload limits for public defenders in the Standards for Indigent Defense are mandatory and that courts lack authority to order attorneys or agencies to violate these limits. However, the court found that the trial court did not actually order DPD to violate the caseload limits, as it left the method of compliance to DPD. The court reversed the orders as they applied to the King County Executive but affirmed the orders requiring DPD to provide counsel. View "In re Det. of M.E." on Justia Law

A woman with a long history of lupus, a chronic autoimmune disease, was under the care of a rheumatologist who managed her symptoms with medications over several years. In early 2018, the patient experienced severe joint pain and other symptoms, and her physician adjusted treatments accordingly. In February, she visited a walk-in clinic with fever and chills; tests were negative for infection, but a chest X-ray showed a possible abnormality. As a precaution, antibiotics were prescribed, and her symptoms improved. In March, she again presented with a fever and minor symptoms. The rheumatologist ordered new tests and increased her medication but did not urgently refer her to an infectious disease specialist or order new chest imaging. Over the following weeks, her symptoms worsened, leading to hospitalization, emergency surgery, and ultimately her death from intestinal tuberculosis.Her spouse, representing her estate, filed a medical malpractice suit against the treating physician and clinic, alleging a failure to meet the standard of care by not acting more urgently on March 1 and 2. Both sides presented expert testimony about the standard of care. The plaintiff objected to a jury instruction allowing the jury to consider whether the physician’s exercise of judgment in choosing among alternative treatments was reasonable, arguing it was unwarranted and prejudicial. The Snohomish County Superior Court gave the instruction, and the jury found for the defense.The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that evidence supported the instruction because the physician made choices among treatments and exercised clinical judgment. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the record contained sufficient evidence to justify the "exercise of judgment" instruction. The court held that such an instruction is proper when the record contains evidence that the physician’s decision-making process and treatment choices complied with the applicable standard of care. The court affirmed, concluding the trial court acted within its discretion. View "Beard v. Everett Clinic, PLLC" on Justia Law

An individual died from a heroin overdose while incarcerated in a county jail, after another inmate smuggled the drug into the facility and provided it to him. The jail had a known, ongoing issue with inmates smuggling drugs and evading searches, and the person who brought in the drugs had a history of such behavior but was not thoroughly searched. The decedent’s estate sued the county, alleging negligence for failing to prevent the smuggling and resultant death.The Superior Court denied the county’s motion for summary judgment, in which the county sought to invoke two statutory defenses: the felony bar defense (RCW 4.24.420) and the intoxication defense (RCW 5.40.060). The court certified the case for interlocutory review. The Washington Court of Appeals accepted review, focusing on whether the jailer’s special common law duty to protect inmates precluded the county from asserting these statutory defenses. The Court of Appeals concluded that the county could not invoke the statutory defenses, based on prior Washington Supreme Court decisions interpreting the jail’s special duty.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the existence of the jailer’s special common law duty to protect incarcerated individuals does not preclude the county from raising the statutory felony and intoxication defenses enacted by the legislature. The court concluded that these statutes do not abrogate the jailer’s duty but create separate affirmative defenses that, if proven, bar liability. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the county may assert both statutory defenses. View "Anderson v. Grant County" on Justia Law

A city councilmember in Stevenson, Washington, participated in a protest outside the Skamania County Courthouse on International Transgender Day of Visibility. During the demonstration, she exposed her breasts with the phrase “MY BODY IS NOT A SIN” written on her chest as a form of protest. Police officers approached her regarding potential violation of Washington’s indecent exposure law (RCW 9A.88.010), but she asserted her actions were protected by the First Amendment and was neither arrested nor charged.A local resident filed a recall petition in Skamania County Superior Court, alleging that the councilmember committed malfeasance and violated her oath of office by engaging in indecent exposure, which the petitioner argued justified her removal from office. The Skamania County Superior Court found the recall charge factually and legally sufficient, determining that malfeasance simply required the commission of an unlawful act, and certified the ballot synopsis. The court reasoned that it was ultimately up to voters to decide if the conduct amounted to a violation of the law.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that the recall petition was neither factually nor legally sufficient. It found that there was no evidence the councilmember intended to violate the law, as indecent exposure under RCW 9A.88.010 requires intentional open and obscene exposure, and the facts indicated she believed her conduct was lawful protest. Furthermore, the court concluded her actions were constitutionally protected expressive conduct. The court also determined that there was no factual or legal basis for a violation of the oath of office, as her conduct was not related to her official duties. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the superior court’s ruling and dismissed the recall petition. View "In re Recall of Lauser" on Justia Law

A county commissioner in Washington hired as her assistant a person with whom she had a preexisting intimate relationship. She stated that her previous assistant did not meet her performance expectations and she wanted someone she already knew. Prior to hiring, she reviewed county policies and found no restrictions on dating subordinates. The personal relationship ended about a month after hiring, but the professional relationship continued until the commissioner terminated the employee. During their personal relationship, the employee sent the commissioner $1,500 for a plane ticket, gave her $50 for gas, and occasionally bought her coffee, food, and gifts. A subsequent county investigation could not determine whether the $1,500 was a loan or a gift and found no evidence of job-related favoritism or that the employment was contingent on the personal relationship.A registered voter in the county filed a recall petition, alleging that the commissioner committed misfeasance, malfeasance, or violated her oath of office by hiring someone with whom she had a personal relationship and accepting money and gifts from that employee. The Thurston County Superior Court dismissed charges three, four, and five as factually insufficient due to lack of specific acts or dates. The court amended charges one and two to include more detail and found them factually sufficient, but ruled all charges legally insufficient because the petition did not identify any specific law, policy, or standard violated or explain how the conduct constituted a recallable offense.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the matter de novo. It held that while charges one and two were factually sufficient, none of the charges were legally sufficient because they failed to specify a violated standard, show manifestly unreasonable conduct, or demonstrate any impact on the commissioner’s official duties. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the recall petition. View "In re Recall of Clouse" on Justia Law

This case involves four individuals who died by suicide after ingesting high-purity sodium nitrite purchased through Amazon’s website. The families and estates of the decedents allege that Amazon sold sodium nitrite without age verification or adequate warnings, promoted related products that facilitated suicide, and continued selling the chemical despite knowing it was being used for suicide. Plaintiffs contend that Amazon’s actions enhanced the risk of harm and demonstrated knowledge of the product’s misuse, citing Amazon’s receipt of warnings from consumers, regulatory agencies, and the removal of the product in other jurisdictions.The Superior Court denied Amazon’s motions to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim for negligence under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA). On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed this decision. The appellate court concluded that, under Washington law, suicide is typically a superseding cause that breaks the chain of proximate causation for negligence, barring recovery unless the suicide was involuntary or due to an uncontrollable impulse. Relying on precedent, the appellate court held that plaintiffs could not state a WPLA claim because suicide was a superseding cause as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case de novo. It determined that common law principles of negligence and proximate cause, including those developed after the WPLA’s enactment, govern product seller liability claims. The court held that, at the motion to dismiss stage, it cannot be said as a matter of law that suicide is always a superseding cause precluding liability under the WPLA. The court concluded that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for product seller negligence, as questions of foreseeability and proximate cause are generally issues for the fact finder. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s denial of Amazon’s motions to dismiss. View "Scott v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

A property owner sought judicial review of a city’s decision under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) after the city canceled her land use application for inactivity. The owner, having taken over the application from the prior owner, received multiple requests from the city for additional information and corrections over two years but failed to satisfy them. After being granted several extensions, the city sent a written decision canceling the application via e-mail to the owner and her attorney.The owner filed a LUPA petition in King County Superior Court and attempted service on the city within the statutory 21-day period, but the first attempt was made on a city office assistant who was not statutorily authorized to receive service. A subsequent attempt, this time on the city manager (an authorized person), occurred after the 21-day deadline. The superior court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction due to improper and untimely service, and the owner appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the first service attempt sufficed and that the three-day tolling provision for mailed decisions applied to decisions sent by e-mail, making the second attempt timely.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that personal service under RCW 4.28.080(2) must be made on individuals specifically designated by statute, such as the mayor, city manager, or city clerk, or their designated agents. Service on a non-designated city employee is insufficient. The court further held that LUPA’s three-day tolling provision applies only to decisions sent by postal mail, not by e-mail. Thus, the 21-day period began when the city’s e-mail provided notice of the decision’s public availability. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chandrruangphen v. City Of Sammamish" on Justia Law

A political action committee comprised of residents and registered voters in Richland, Washington, submitted a valid petition in October 2024 to amend the city charter. The proposed amendment would change the composition of the city council to be partly elected by district and partly at large. The Benton County Auditor, upon receiving the petition, scheduled the proposed amendment for the November 2025 general election ballot. The committee, however, sought to have the measure placed on a special election ballot in either February or April 2025.The committee filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in Benton County Superior Court, seeking an order to compel the auditor to place the amendment on the special election ballot. The superior court judge denied the writ, ruling that the amendment would appear on the November 2025 general election ballot instead. The committee obtained direct review of this decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington unanimously concluded that the case was moot because the relevant special election dates had passed. Nonetheless, the court exercised its discretion to address the issue as one of continuing and substantial public interest. The majority of justices held that the phrase “next regular municipal election” in RCW 35.22.120 includes both special and general elections. However, a majority also agreed that mandamus was not appropriate in this case because the petitioner did not establish a nondiscretionary duty requiring the auditor to call a special election. The court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the writ of mandamus. View "A Better Richland v. Chilton" on Justia Law

Ahmed Mohamud Wasuge was found asleep in his car, which was blocking a lane of traffic on a residential road in King County, Washington. Police arrived after a 911 call and observed Wasuge in the driver’s seat with the engine running and the transmission in drive. Officers noted signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol, glassy and bloodshot eyes, and unsteady movements. Wasuge denied drinking but performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was measured at 0.076 percent. He was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) under the “affected by” prong of the statute, as well as operating a vehicle without a functioning ignition interlock device and driving while his license was revoked.At trial in the King County Superior Court, Wasuge attempted to suppress non-Mirandized statements, but the motion was denied. The jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on the felony DUI but convicted him of the lesser offense of being in actual physical control of a vehicle while “affected by” intoxicating liquor. He was also convicted on the other counts. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the admission of a toxicologist’s testimony about impairment at BAC levels below the legal limit was improper but harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court further concluded that Wasuge was not in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned by police.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The main holdings are: (1) any error in admitting the toxicologist’s testimony was harmless under both constitutional and nonconstitutional standards, given the strength of the properly admitted evidence; and (2) courts may consider relevant and objective evidence of race and ethnicity in applying the “totality of the circumstances” custody test for Miranda purposes, though Wasuge was not in custody at the time of the contested questioning. View "State v. Wasuge" on Justia Law