Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An employee of King County’s Department of Natural Resources and Parks, who is Latino and uses hearing aids, raised concerns about bias in a hiring policy and subsequently experienced several adverse events at work. After expressing his concerns about discrimination, he was reprimanded, received letters of expectation, was placed on administrative leave, given a poor performance review, suspended without pay, and reassigned to a position with less responsibility. The employee claimed these actions were retaliatory and discriminatory under the Washington Law Against Discrimination.The employee filed suit in the Superior Court for discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and disability, as well as retaliation. At trial, the jury was instructed using a single instruction that combined pattern jury instructions for “adverse employment action” from both discrimination and retaliation claims. The jury found that the county did not discriminate, but did retaliate against the employee. King County appealed, arguing that the combined instruction was misleading. The Washington Court of Appeals agreed, finding the instruction erroneous and remanding for a new trial on the retaliation claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the jury instruction combining two definitions of “adverse employment action” was misleading and, if so, whether it constituted reversible error. The court held that while the instruction was ambiguous and potentially misleading, King County failed to establish that it suffered prejudice as a result. The ambiguity did not lower the employee’s burden of proof or prevent the county from arguing its theory of the case. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining appellate issues. The main holding is that a misleading jury instruction warrants reversal only if the challenging party demonstrates prejudice, which was not shown here. View "Verduzco v. King County" on Justia Law

Two individuals, each with multiple convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) within seven years in Washington State, challenged a state law that temporarily prohibits people with such convictions from possessing firearms. Their applications for concealed carry permits were denied based on this statute, and they subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the law violated their rights under the Second Amendment. The statute in question allows individuals disarmed under this provision to petition for restoration of firearm rights after five years of law-abiding conduct.The Spokane County Superior Court denied the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings but granted its request for further factual development, ruling that there were material issues of fact—specifically, whether either petitioner posed a credible threat to public safety. The trial court allowed the as-applied constitutional challenge to proceed, focusing on whether an individualized assessment of dangerousness was required under recent Supreme Court precedent.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted direct interlocutory review. It held that, under the Second Amendment, the state may temporarily disarm individuals convicted of multiple DUI offenses without requiring an individualized determination of dangerousness. The court examined the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, finding that longstanding analogs support disarmament of groups with a proven risk of dangerous conduct, such as repeated DUI convictions. The court reasoned that the law at issue is justified by the legislature’s determination that recidivist drunk drivers pose a special danger of firearm misuse, and that such temporary restrictions are consistent with historical tradition. The court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State. View "McLellan v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case concerned a Black defendant who was convicted of second-degree felony murder. During jury selection, the prosecution used a peremptory challenge to exclude juror 40, who was white and had selected “prefer not to answer” regarding gender on a questionnaire. This juror had expressed strong concerns about racial bias in law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Defense counsel objected to the State’s peremptory strike by citing General Rule 37 (GR 37), but specifically raised only an argument about gender identity discrimination, not race or ethnicity.At trial, the King County Superior Court allowed the State’s challenge, finding that juror 40’s political views and demeanor, not their (presumed) gender identity, were valid grounds for exclusion. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that defense counsel’s objection based on gender identity did not preserve a GR 37 claim related to race, and thus the trial court did not err.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It clarified that an objection to a peremptory strike under GR 37 can be preserved by simply invoking the rule, but in this instance, defense counsel undermined the objection by focusing solely on gender identity. However, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to review the race discrimination claim, emphasizing the importance of addressing racial bias even if not properly preserved below.The Supreme Court held that the State failed to comply with GR 37(i) procedures by relying on uncorroborated demeanor-based justifications for its peremptory challenge, which could not be considered. While the State’s use of juror 40’s views on law enforcement as a justification was presumptively invalid under GR 37(h), the totality of circumstances rebutted this presumption. The court concluded that an objective observer could not view race as a factor in the State’s strike and affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "State v. Hogan" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple violations involving domestic violence protection orders, stalking, and criminal impersonation. During trial, after the State presented significant evidence, the defendant chose to waive his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to all counts, also admitting to facts supporting an aggravating factor. Before entering his guilty plea, the defendant had attempted to represent himself but ultimately decided against it after conferring with his attorney. The trial court conducted a full plea colloquy and found the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.At sentencing, the defendant informed the court he wished to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming it was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel. His appointed attorney characterized the motion as a collateral attack and declined to argue it, so the trial court permitted the defendant to present the motion himself. The trial judge denied the motion, determining it lacked merit under the applicable standard for withdrawal before judgment. No new counsel was appointed. The court then sentenced the defendant. The Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court was not required to appoint substitute counsel or hold a hearing on the withdrawal motion if it found the defendant’s claims lacked merit.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the defendant was completely denied counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution—specifically, during his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The court held that, because the defendant’s counsel remained appointed and available, and there was no actual conflict of interest or deprivation of counsel, there was not a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Korsakas" on Justia Law

A woman, A.H., went to the residence of Leif Buck, with whom she shares two children, to discuss a parenting plan. During the visit, Buck became physically aggressive, holding A.H. on the couch and dragging her across the floor. When A.H. stated she would call the sheriff, Buck took her cell phone from her pocket, which prevented her from immediately contacting authorities. A.H. then told Buck she would go to the sheriff’s office, to which Buck responded he would not be present when she returned. A.H. subsequently reported the incident to the sheriff’s office and sought medical attention.Buck was charged with, among other offenses, interfering with the reporting of domestic violence under RCW 9A.36.150. At trial in the Superior Court, the jury was instructed that it could convict Buck if it found he prevented or attempted to prevent A.H. from calling 911, obtaining medical assistance, or making a report to law enforcement. The jury found Buck guilty. On appeal to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three, Buck argued that the statute created an alternative means crime, requiring jury unanimity as to the specific means, and cited State v. Nonog, a Division One decision to this effect. Division Three disagreed, holding that the statute did not create alternative means, and affirmed the conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted review to resolve conflicting appellate decisions. The Supreme Court held that RCW 9A.36.150(1)(b) defines a single crime—interfering with the reporting of domestic violence—and does not establish three alternative means based on the method of reporting. The Court reasoned that the statute focuses on the defendant’s conduct, not the actions of the victim or witness, and does not present distinct criminal acts. The Supreme Court affirmed Division Three’s decision and expressly overruled the contrary holding in Division One’s Nonog decision. View "State v. Buck" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner pleaded guilty in 2004 to multiple counts of theft of a firearm and theft in the first and second degree, receiving a sentence of 30 months’ confinement and legal financial obligations. While serving this sentence, the State obtained evidence implicating him in a murder, for which he later also pleaded guilty. He completed his sentence for the theft convictions but remained incarcerated for the murder conviction. In 2022, while still in prison, he moved to vacate his 2004 theft convictions.The Superior Court denied his motion, finding that the requisite period had not elapsed since his release from confinement, as required by RCW 9.94A.640(2)(e). On appeal, the Washington State Court of Appeals held that the statute required only that the necessary number of years had passed since release for the offenses sought to be vacated, not all offenses for which the individual is incarcerated. The Court of Appeals also determined that a court must consider evidence of rehabilitation before granting vacatur. The court affirmed the denial of the motion but without prejudice, allowing the petitioner to refile with evidence of rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that RCW 9.94A.640 does not permit individuals to seek vacatur if they have never been released from confinement on all convictions, interpreting “release from full and partial confinement” to mean release from custody on all offenses. The court also held that applicants must present evidence of rehabilitation for a court to consider vacatur, in line with its prior decision in State v. Hawkins. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Abrams" on Justia Law

A patient received medical care at a hospital and was billed for those services. At the time, the patient’s income allegedly qualified her for financial assistance known as charity care under Washington law, which is designed to help low-income patients pay hospital bills. The hospital did not determine the patient’s eligibility for charity care before billing her and subsequently assigned the debt to a collection agency. The agency sued to collect the debt, obtained a judgment, and did not provide any information about the availability of charity care in its communications. The patient only learned about the program after judgment and was later granted a partial reduction by the hospital, but the collection agency refused to honor it, citing its policy against reductions after court judgment.The patient filed a class action against the collection agency in Skagit County Superior Court, alleging violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), the Collection Agency Act (CAA), and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court dismissed some claims, including those under the CAA, and divided the remaining claims into “failure-to-screen” and “failure-to-notify” theories. The court dismissed the “failure-to-screen” theory, retained the “failure-to-notify” theory, and certified a question of state law to the Washington Supreme Court regarding whether the charity care notice requirements apply to collection agencies.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the statutory requirement to give notice of charity care under RCW 70.170.060(8)(a) applies to collection agencies collecting hospital debt. The court explained that the policy and plain language of the statute require patients to be notified by all entities engaged in billing or collection, including collection agencies, and that the duty to provide notice passes to assignees of hospital debt. View "Preston v. SB&C, Ltd." on Justia Law

A worker at the Cherry Point oil refinery in Washington was regularly exposed to asbestos-containing insulation during his employment, which began in 1971. The insulation at issue was chosen, supplied, and installed by a subcontractor as part of the refinery’s original construction in the early 1970s. Decades after his exposure, the worker developed mesothelioma and died from the disease. His estate brought claims against numerous defendants, including the subcontractor, based on alleged asbestos exposure at the refinery.The Whatcom County Superior Court first granted summary judgment for the subcontractor, relying on Maxwell v. Atlantic Richfield Co., which held that Washington’s six-year construction statute of repose barred such claims. However, the court reconsidered and denied summary judgment after the Washington Court of Appeals issued Welch v. Brand Insulations, Inc., which found there were factual questions about whether the subcontractor’s activities were covered by the statute of repose. Due to conflicting appellate decisions, the Supreme Court of Washington granted direct review.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that claims against the subcontractor arising from its construction activities—specifically, its installation of asbestos insulation as part of constructing an improvement on real property—are barred by the construction statute of repose. However, the court held that claims based on the subcontractor’s independent role as a product seller or supplier, separate from its construction activities, are not barred by the statute of repose. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine which claims, if any, survive under theories of product seller or supplier liability. The court declined to address the constitutionality of the statute of repose, as that issue was not timely raised. View "Polinder v. Aecom Energy & Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

A homeowner obtained a home equity line of credit (HELOC) secured by a deed of trust, subsequently defaulted, and faced nonjudicial foreclosure initiated by a party claiming to be the beneficiary. The loan servicer, acting on behalf of the claimed beneficiary, executed a declaration asserting that the beneficiary was the “holder” of the HELOC agreement, as required by Washington’s Deed of Trust Act (DTA) for nonjudicial foreclosure. The homeowner challenged the foreclosure in federal court, arguing that a HELOC is not a negotiable instrument and, therefore, the entity seeking foreclosure could not be its “holder” as contemplated by the DTA.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the homeowner’s quiet title and some statutory claims were dismissed, but other claims were allowed to proceed. Recognizing that state law questions were central and unresolved, the district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington: (1) whether a typical HELOC is a negotiable instrument under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and (2) whether a party claiming to be a beneficiary can satisfy the DTA’s “holder” requirement by declaring it holds a HELOC agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that a HELOC agreement, as described, is not a negotiable instrument because it does not contain an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money. The court further held that under the DTA, “holder” means the holder of a negotiable instrument as defined by Article 3 of the UCC. Therefore, a party cannot fulfill the DTA’s proof-of-beneficiary requirement for nonjudicial foreclosure simply by declaring it is the holder of a nonnegotiable HELOC agreement. This does not preclude judicial remedies, but nonjudicial foreclosure is unavailable in such circumstances. View "Vargas v. RRA CP Opportunity Tr. 1" on Justia Law

Several former foster children brought lawsuits against the State of Washington, alleging that the State negligently placed them in foster homes where they suffered abuse and failed to adequately investigate reports of abuse. To support their claims, the plaintiffs requested discovery of various records from the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), including their own child welfare records, records about their biological and foster families, reports of abuse, and information about other children placed with the same foster parents. These records were sought to show whether the State breached its duty to protect them.In response, the State asserted that disclosure of these records was barred by statutory privilege under RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) and by confidentiality requirements under RCW 13.50.100. The State moved for protective orders in the trial courts, but the trial courts denied the State’s motions, ordered the requested records produced (with redaction and protective orders to limit their use), and specified procedures to maintain confidentiality. The State sought discretionary review, and the Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted review, consolidating the cases and staying the trial courts’ orders pending its decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while the records sought by the plaintiffs are privileged under RCW 74.04.060(1)(a), an exception in the statute applies because these lawsuits directly concern the administration of the foster care program. Therefore, the privilege does not prevent disclosure. The court also held that RCW 13.50.100 does not bar disclosure of the requested records, as the information pertains to the plaintiffs. The court affirmed the trial courts’ orders compelling discovery, denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees and costs, and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M.I. v. State" on Justia Law