Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the Benton County Water Conservancy Board (the Board) and the Washington State Department of Ecology (the Department). The Department primarily manages the state's water resources, while the Board has coextensive authority to process voluntary water right transfers between water right holders. The dispute arose when the Board challenged a department policy (Policy 1070) concerning certain water right transfers. The Board claimed that it suffered injury-in-fact from the Department's refusal to accept certain administrative division forms pursuant to the policy.The case was first heard in the superior court, which granted summary judgment to the Board and directed the Department to accept administrative division requests from the Board. The Department appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the Board lacked standing to challenge the Department's action.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the Board lacked standing to challenge Department Policy 1070. The Board failed to demonstrate how it suffered injury-in-fact from the Department’s refusal to accept certain administrative division forms pursuant to the policy. The Board suffered no prejudice and its interests would not be redressed by invalidating the policy. The court concluded that the Board's interests were indirect and inchoate, and it failed to establish injury-in-fact under the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the Board lacked standing to pursue this challenge to the Department’s use of Policy 1070. View "Benton County Water Conservancy Board v. Department of Ecology" on Justia Law

The case involves AURC III LLC, an Oregon limited liability company, and several Washington and Delaware limited liability companies collectively referred to as Point Ruston. Point Ruston purchased a 97-acre former copper smelter and environmental clean-up site located on the Puget Sound waterfront in Ruston and Tacoma, Washington, for $169,000,000 and developed it in phases. To fund the second phase of development, Point Ruston negotiated a $66 million loan from American United Development Group, which created AURC III LLC to raise and manage funds from foreign investors seeking United States residency. After disbursing the full amount of the loan, AURC filed an amended complaint against Point Ruston, alleging that Point Ruston was delinquent on interest payments in breach of its loan agreement. The superior court ordered Point Ruston and AURC to engage in arbitration as per their loan agreement.The arbitrator issued an interim award only on the amount of current and default interest due and awarded $10,969,015 to AURC. The arbitrator then issued a final award for the same amount, as well as awarding attorney fees and arbitration fees and expenses. In total, Point Ruston was required to pay over $11.4 million. AURC moved to confirm the award and for presentation of judgment. Initially, Point Ruston agreed AURC was “entitled to confirmation of the Award and entry of a Final Judgment” but opposed attaching the arbitrator’s awards to that judgment. Before the court could enter the written confirmation order and judgment, Point Ruston paid the award and filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot because no live dispute remained. After AURC alerted the court that it received the award amount from Point Ruston, the court denied the motion to dismiss. The court entered the confirmation order with the interim and final awards attached as exhibits, as well as a judgment against Point Ruston. AURC filed a full satisfaction of judgment.Point Ruston appealed on two grounds. It challenged (1) the superior court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and (2) the court’s decision to attach the arbitration awards to the confirmation order. Division Two of the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Point Ruston sought review in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that when a party seeks a confirmation order, RCW 7.04A.220 requires issuance of the order subject to narrow exceptions inapplicable here. Payment of an arbitration award does not render the underlying case moot. The court also held that attaching an arbitrator’s award merely identifies the basis for the confirmation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase II, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the Gardens Condominium (a Washington nonprofit corporation) and Farmers Insurance Exchange (a California company) over the interpretation of a resulting loss exception in an all-risk insurance policy. The Gardens Condominium discovered water damage to the roof's fireboard, sheathing, and several sleepers and joists in 2019, caused by faulty construction which led to insufficient ventilation in the roof assembly. They sought coverage for the cost of repairing the damage, which was denied by Farmers Insurance Exchange, who argued that the damage was excluded under the faulty workmanship exclusion in the policy.The trial court ruled in favor of Farmers Insurance Exchange, stating that the policy intended to exclude damage where an uncovered event, such as faulty workmanship, initiated a sequence of events causing damage. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the resulting loss exception preserved coverage.The case reached the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. The court, following a de novo review, sided with the Court of Appeals, stating that a resulting loss exception must have effect to preserve coverage for loss resulting from covered perils, even if the peril is the natural consequence of an excluded peril. The court concluded that a resulting loss exception to the faulty workmanship exclusion revives coverage, even if the faulty workmanship exclusion would otherwise deny it. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Gardens Condominium v. Farmers Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, several construction industry associations challenged a 2018 law (RCW 39.12.015(3)) that changed the method for determining prevailing wage rates on public works projects. Prior to the law, the State used wage and hour surveys to establish the prevailing wage rates. The 2018 law directed the State to adopt the wage rates established in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) for those trades and occupations that have CBAs.The plaintiffs argued that the new law violated a provision of the Washington Constitution (article II, section 37) because it conflicted with an older law (RCW 39.12.026(1)) that restricted the use of wage data collected by the State to the county in which the work was performed. The Court of Appeals agreed and declared the new law unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the older law's restriction on the use of wage data applied only to data collected through wage and hour surveys, not to wage rates adopted from CBAs. Therefore, the older law did not conflict with the new law, and the new law did not violate the state constitution. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Associated General Contractors Of Washington v. State" on Justia Law

In "King County v. Michael J. Abernathy et al.", the Supreme Court of the State of Washington answered a question certified by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The case involved a dispute over the ownership of a 3.6 mile section of land along the shore of Lake Sammamish, known as the Corridor. In 1887, prior to Washington becoming a state, a railroad company was granted a "right-of-way" to build a railroad over the Corridor. Since then, the Corridor and surrounding shorelands have been used by various parties including individual property owners, the state, and the county. The certified question asked whether a right-of-way approved by the United States Department of the Interior under the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 is a conveyance "patented by the United States" under Article XVII, Section 2 of the Washington State Constitution. If the land was "patented" by the federal government, it would have been owned by the railroad and later King County. If the land was not patented, Washington would have owned it at the time of statehood and later conveyed it to private parties, and the shoreland would currently belong to the homeowners, the Abernathys. The Washington Supreme Court held that the right-of-way was an easement and did not constitute a land conveyance patented by the United States. Therefore, the land belonged to Washington at the time of statehood and is presently owned by the homeowners. View "King County v. Abernathy" on Justia Law

In Washington State, a second-tier subcontractor, Velazquez Framing LLC, was not paid for the work it did on property owned by Cascadia Homes Inc., a general contracting company. High End Construction LLC, who had been contracted by Cascadia, subcontracted the work to Velazquez without informing Cascadia. After completing the work, Velazquez filed a lien for labor and materials without giving prelien notice, which resulted in a dispute over whether prelien notice was required for labor liens under Chapter 60.04 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled that, based on the plain language of the relevant statutes and legislative history, prelien notice is not required for labor liens. The court noted that while Velazquez could not lien for its materials and equipment without providing prelien notice, it could lien for its labor. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the value of the labor performed. The court's decision reversed the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, both of which had concluded that prelien notice was required. View "Velazquez Framing, LLC v. Cascadia Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

In Washington, a couple, the Lewises, moved into a rental property owned by another couple, the Ridgways. After the Lewises moved out, a dispute arose over the return of their security deposit. The Ridgways claimed the Lewises caused damage to the property and deducted repair costs from the deposit. The Lewises disputed these charges, and the case was sent to arbitration. During arbitration, the Lewises were awarded the full amount of their security deposit, but the Ridgways were given attorney fees under the small claims statute. The Lewises attempted to appeal the arbitration award and a pre-arbitration order granting partial summary judgment to the Ridgways. However, the Lewises did not personally sign their request for a trial de novo, a requirement under court rules and the arbitration statute.The Washington Supreme Court held that the Lewises' request for a trial de novo was ineffective because they did not personally sign the request, as required by the court rule and the arbitration statute. The court also held that, absent a valid request for a trial de novo, the Lewises could not appeal the pre-arbitration order granting partial summary judgment to the Ridgways. The court further stated that the question of who should be considered the prevailing party for the purpose of any attorney fee award needed further consideration, and remanded the case back to the lower court for determination of attorney fees. View "Crossroads Mgmt., LLC v. Ridgway" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to determine whether a landowner could delegate its duty to protect invitees on its premises from known or obvious dangers to an independent contractor. The case arose from the death of Jeffry Eylander, an employee of an independent contractor, Commercial Industrial Roofing Inc. (CIR), who fell through a skylight while cleaning the roof of a warehouse owned by Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund and Prologis Management LLC (collectively, Prologis). Eylander's daughter, as personal representative of his estate, sued Prologis for wrongful death, alleging that Prologis had breached its duty of reasonable care to protect Eylander from harm.The Court held that Prologis had reasonably delegated its duty of reasonable care to protect invitees from known or obvious dangers to CIR. The Court found that Prologis had fulfilled its duty by selecting a professional and experienced contractor, CIR, and by requiring CIR to follow all applicable laws, be solely responsible for the health and safety of its employees, and create and post a site-specific safety plan before starting work. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Prologis. View "Eylander v. Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association foreclosed on property owned by real estate company Dalton M, LLC. The bank did not have the right to do that: Dalton M actually owned the property outright, not subject to any lien. Dalton M ended up suing U.S. Bank to quiet title and for damages for slander of title. Dalton M prevailed at trial on both of those claims. The trial court also awarded substantial fees to Dalton M based on the slander of title claim. The Court of Appeals reversed on that claim, holding that Dalton M had failed to prove its “pending sale” element, which wiped out the sole basis for the trial court's fee award. Instead, the Court of Appeals awarded fees to Dalton M on an entirely new theory that no party had pleaded or argued to the trial court and that the trial court had never considered: the theory that U.S. Bank had engaged in extensive prelitigation bad faith conduct not amounting to violation or contempt of any court order or ruling, and that this provided a new equitable exception to Washington’s general rule that each party must bear their own costs of suit. The Washington Supreme Court determined the appellate court's decision violated both the Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAPs) and Washington controlling precedent. The Court of Appeals violated these rules: it sua sponte raised a new issue that was more like an unpleaded claim, that new issue was distinct from issues or theories raised before, resolution of that new issue was not necessary to resolve the questions presented about the claims actually pleaded, and resolution of that new issue depended on facts that the parties never had a chance to develop at trial. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ award of attorney fees. View "Dalton M, LLC v. N. Cascade Tr. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1993, respondents Brock and Diane Maslonka purchased land bordering the Pend Oreille River. A dam had been constructed on the river in 1955. The previous owners informed the Maslonkas that the land occasionally flooded. In 2016, the Maslonka sued the Pend Oreille Public Utility District (PUD), alleging its operation of the dam entitled them to damages based on inverse condemnation, trespass, nuisance and negligence. The trial court found the subsequent purchaser rule barred the inverse condemnation claim, and the PUD established a prescriptive easement barring the trespass and nuisance claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the PUD could not benefit from the subsequent purchaser rule because it failed to prove its conduct constituted a taking prior ro the Maslonkas’ purchase. The Washington Supreme Court held that an inverse condemnation claimant must show the subsequent purchaser rule does not bar their suit. Further, an inverse condemnation claimant barred by the subsequent purchaser rule has no viable tort claim if the tort is based ont he’s same government conduct. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court to reinstate its summary judgment orders. View "Maslonka v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County" on Justia Law